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NIAGARA MOHAWK v. FPC: HAVE
PRIVATE WATER RIGHTS BEEN
DESTROYED BY THE FEDERAL
POWER ACT?
Charles P. Schwartz, Jr. t
INTRODUCTION

For eons water has flowed over Niagara Falls. At this late date
the, extent to which this water power is private property is an open
question. This is true not only of Niagara, but also of all other
navigable rivers in the United States.
This question may finally be answered in the case of Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp.,v. FPC,' in which the FPC contended that the
Federal Power Act2 erased all state created property interests in
water power. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found
exactly to the contrary, one judge dissenting, and the Supreme Court
has granted certiorari. This article suggests that the decision below
is only partially correct.
If the FPC is correct, millions of dollars long thought to exist
as values attributable to water rights will be destroyed in one fell
swoop. In this case alone at least $5,780,000 is ultimately involved.'
The problems raised are difficult and complex. The legislative history is
sparse, and a maze of judicial opinions must be mastered in order
to sensibly analyze the Power Act. And since the FPC proposal would
wipe out interests in water, long thought to constitute property, this
analysis must be tempered with the sensitivity and fairness necessary
for a just result.
The Federal Power Act requires regulation and licensing of all
water power projects using navigable waters.' At the expiration of
t A.B. 1945, University of Chicago; LL. B. 1950, Harvard University. Teaching Fellow, Harvard Law School.
1. 202 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1952), reversing 9 F.P.C. 228 (1950), cert. granted,
345 U.S. 955 (1953).
2. 49 STAT. 863 (1920), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 791(a) et seq. (1946). This
article will be concerned principally with Part I of the Act, which relates only to
water power licensees. Title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 838
(1935), 16 U.S.C. 796 (1946), is the Federal Power Act, and § 212 provided that
the original f§ 1-29 of the Federal Water Power Act, 41 STAT. 1077 (1920) should
constitute Part I. The licensee provisions of the Federal Power Act remain substantially as they were originally enacted in 1920.
3. See note 52 in!ra.
4. The matters outlined here are all discussed in much greater detail below.
(31)
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each license the United States may purchase or "recapture" the project
upon payment of the licensee's "net investment" in it. Under the
Act this net investment is roughly the cost of the project less certain
deductions.' The principal deductions are earnings of the project
in excess of a "fair return" on its costs.
Of course, earnings are commonly thought to be receipts less
operating expenses and overhead. In the present case the FPC refused
to allow as an operating expense, rentals for water rights, payment
of which was required by state property law. The commission asserted
that the Power Act destroyed such water rights. Since the licensee
needed only his federal license to use the water, the rentals were
unnecessary and thus not valid operating expenses. Consequently the
amount paid as rent was to be added to reported earnings. Presumably
it follows that the FPC would also disallow as a project cost any
expenditure made to acquire a fee interest in water rights. Nor
would it seem to make any difference whether the moneys paid were
for the water rights severed from the land, or constituted that part
of the rent or cost of land attributable to attached water rights.
The Federal Government does not now seek to recapture Niagara's
project, but a licensee's net investment in his project must be determined
prior to recapture since it is also used for other purposes. For instance
in this case the question involves setting up the amortization reserves
required by the Act.' This reserve includes excessive earnings made
after twenty years of operation of a project and will be credited
against the price to be paid on recapture by the United States.
One last word of introduction; it must, of course, be realized that
interests in flowing water cannot be termed "property" in the same
way as can ownership of land, bonds, or automobiles.
"For water is a movable, wandering thing, and must of necessity continue common by the law of nature; so that I can only have
a temporary, transient, usufructuary, property therein." 7
In addition, the many limitations that have been imposed upon this
right to use water power 8 must be considered in describing any set
of water rights.
5. Section 3(13), 16 U.S.C. §796(13) (1946).
6. Section 10(d), 16 U.S.C. §803(d) (1946). In addition to serving as the
recapture price (§ 10(d), 16 U.S.C. § 803(d) (1946)), the net investment serves:
as the rate base for any rates fixed by the FPC (§20, 16 U.S.C. §813 (1946));
the basis for determining the rental to be paid by the United States in the event of a
temporary taking of the project during a national emergency (§ 16, 16 U.S.C. § 809
(1946)) ; and the price to be paid by the United States at a court sale in the event
of forfeiture of the license (§26, 16 U.S.C. § 820 (1946)).
7. 2 BL. Comm. *18.
8. As Mr. Justice Jackson has said:

"...

that a closed catalogue of abstract

and absolute 'property rights' in water hovers over a given piece of shore land,
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PAST AND PRESENT USE OF NIAGARA WATER

The Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation uses all water that the
United States permits to be diverted from the Niagara River (near
the Falls) under the International Boundary Waters Treaty of 1910; '
this amounts to 19,725 c.f.s.10 Since 1921 this diversion has been
made under a fifty year license issued in that year by the FPC pursuant
to the Power Act. However, a more detailed account of the use of
Niagara water will help place this case into its proper perspective.
The relevant history starts in 1891 when a predecessor of
Niagara "- was planning to build a power plant on the river above
the Falls. This planning culminated in the Adams Plant, which now
takes water from the river, runs it through the plant and discharges
it via a tunnel into the river at a point below the Falls. 2
good against all the world, is not in this day a permissible assumption. We cannot start the process of decision by calling such a claim as we have here a 'property
right'; whether it is a property right is really the question to be answered. Such
economic uses are rights only when they are legally protected interests. Whether
they are such interests may depend on the claimant's rights in the land to which
he claims the water rights to be appurtenant or incidental; on the navigable or nonnavigable nature of the water from which he advantages; on the substance of the
enjoyment thereof for which he claims legal protection; on the legal relations of
the adversary claimed to be uider a duty to observe or compensate his interests;
and on whether the conflict is with another private riparian interest or with a public
interest in navigation." United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
502 (1945).
At the outset it should be noted that whereas the eastern part of the United
States follows the system of "riparian rights," giving each owner along a river
the right to use water power so long as he returns the water at the downstream
edge of his property, most of the western states follow a system of "prior appropriation," which sometimes permits certain owners along a river to use water power
to the exclusion of other upstream and downstream owners. The problem covered
by this article is unaffected by the difference between these systems. The terms
"riparian" and "water rights," and their derivatives, will be used to refer to both
systems.
9. The treaty limited diversion from the United States side of the river to
20,000 c.f.s. (cubic feet per second). 36 STAT. 2448, 2450 (1909).
10. Niagara also diverts another 12,500 c.f.s. by authority of the FPC and
pursuant to wartime agreements between the United States and Canada providing
for "emergency" diversions.' 55 STAT. 1276, 1380 (1941). Both diversions will in
effect be superseded by a 1950 treaty with Canada. TREATIES & OTHER INT'. AcTs
SER. 2130 (1950).
This last pact limits diversion only by the requirement that a
specific minimum amount of water be allowed to flow over the Falls.
11. Throughout this article "Niagara" will usually refer to the present licensee,
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, or its immediate predecessor, the Niagara
Falls Power Company, which was merged into Niagara Mohawk in 1950. "Niagara"
will also, where required by the context, refer to certain predecessors of Niagara
Falls Power Company which were consolidated in 1918 to form that company.
The variety of corporate entities is not, however, of substantive importance in this
case, except where noted. The pertinent corporate genealogy is found in Niagara
Falls Power Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1943), and in the decision below,
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, supra note 1.
12. This plant effected the first large scale use of water power at Niagara to
generate electricity. It was owned, prior to 1918, by the original Niagara Falls
Power Company, one of the corporations consolidated in 1918 to form the company
of the same name. This latter company was the immediate predecessor of Niagara
Mohawk.
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Closer to, but still above, the Falls was the intake for a
"Hydraulic Canal" owned by another predecessor of Niagara.'3 This
canal runs from the river into a reservoir or basin from which
water was drawn by a number of companies who ran it through
their manufacturing plants located near the top of the river banks.
They returned the water to the river by letting it flow over these banks.
Many years ago the last of these plants was torn down. Water is
now taken from the canal basin only by Niagara, who runs it through
penstocks to its Schoellkopf Plant at the base of the river banks below
the Falls. 4
International Paper Water Rights:-The first of the two sets
of water rights involved in this case are those of the International
Paper Company. It operates a plant on the river above the Falls
right next to Niagara's Adams Plant. In the 1890's, by a series of
transactions International received from a predecessor of Niagara the
right to divert up to 730 c.f.s. so long as it paid specified annual
rentals.'3
It was to return this water to the river via the Adams
Plant tunnel.
In 1918 the Niagara Falls Power Company was formed by a
consolidation of local power companies.1" As part of this transaction
it was decided that the Schoellkopf Plant below the Falls would be
enlarged to utilize all of the 20,000 c.f.s. given to the United States
by the 1910 Treaty. The Adams Plant above the Falls was to be
13. Niagara Falls Hydraulic Power and Manfacturing Company, later known
as the Hydraulic Power Company of Niagara Falls. It was consolidated into the
Niagara Falls Power Company in 1918.
14. The Schoellkoepf Plant is the most modern unit of the Niagara project.
It was built in three sections: Section A (built 1903-14), Section B (built 1918-20)
and Section C (built 1921-24).
A predecessor plant built in 1881 has long since
been torn down. Sections A and B obtain their water from intakes located at the
canal basin, from which it is dropped via penstocks through the turbines and discharged into the Niagara River. Section C obtains its water from a tunnel whose
intake is located near the intake of the canal above the Falls.
15. This was part of a plan of the original Niagara Falls Power Company to
establish close to the Falls an industrial community consisting of heavy industrial
users of electric and water power. The rapid advance in large scale generation of
electricity made it impractical for plants to use water power. Actually, only International and the local water works leased water; the rest contracted for large
amounts of electricity. The transactions by which International and its predecessors
acquired their water rights are complicated. In 1891 it leased its plant site and
water rights, and in 1896 it purchased the fee; the deed provided that International
could divert water sufficient to generate 3000 h.p. upon payment of $24,000 per year
to Niagara. By a lease also made in 1896, and a supplemental agreement made
in 1898, International received the right to divert additional water to develop up
to 2900 h.p. at a fixed rental of $29,000 per year, and still additional water at $10
per h.p. per year. The 1898 agreement extended the outermost limits of the options
contained in the 1896 lease from 1936 to such additional terms of 10 years each as
International desired. It also guaranteed to International for this unlimited period
the right to divert sufficient water to generate 4200 h.p. in addition to the 3000 h.p.
given by the 1896 deed.
16. This company is the immediate predecessor of Niagara Mohawk as to the license involved here. See note 11 supra.
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put on stand-by."1 This arrangement, thought to be the most efficient
use of Niagara water, was urged as a defense measure by the
Government. 8 Included in this arrangement was an agreement by
International to cease generating its own power and to buy electricity
from Niagara. 9 In return Niagara would pay annual rentals of
$99,000 a year for use of the water to which International was otherwise entitled.2"
Pettebone-CataractWater Rights :-The Pettebone-Cataract Companies 2. were among the users of the canal basin's water. They drew
262.6 c.f.s. from the basin, ran it through their mills, and returned
it over the bank to the river.2 " In 1925 Niagara leased these water
rights in a manner similar to the way it leased the International
rights."3 The mills were torn down and in 1947 Niagara purchased
2
the fee to these rights.

4

17. The Adams Plant was not actually put on a stand-by basis until the 1930 's.
Today it is in full operation to utilize the emergency diversion of 12,500 c.f.s. permitted Niagara. See note 10 supra.
18. See 2 ADAMS, NIAGAA

POWER 257 (1927), which states that International's

use of the water was inefficient. Adams' work is a long, detailed history of the use
of Niagara water. It was published by the Niagara Falls Power Company, of which
the author was a founder.
19. At this time (1919) International was developing 8156.2 h.p. (725 c.f.s.)
for Which it paid Niagara $74,562. It had, however, under its deed and lease, the
right to use a total of 730 c.f.s. Transcript of Record, p. 222, Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp. v. FPC, supra note 1. The various deeds, leases, and agreements are
all set forth in the record.
20. The rental provided by the lease was that International was to pay $20 per
e.h.p. (electrical horsepower per year) received from Niagara. But it was not to
pay more than $76,000 a year for the first 8750 e.h.p. used (as "firm power"). At
$20 per e.h.p. International saved $99,000 a year on this firm power, which, when
added to the $75,000 it had been paying in water rentals, meant that it received
about $175,000 each year for its water rights in addition to whatever savings it
made in not operating its own power generating equipment. In 1937 the New York
Public Utilities Service Commission required Niagara to charge uniform industrial
rates. The 1919 agreement was amended to provide for payment of $99,000 a year
in cash to International as the "fair and reasonable annual use or rental value
of the water." Transcript of Record, pp. 243-4, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.
FPC, supra note 1.
21. The proper names of these companies are: Pettebone-Cataract Paper Company and Cataract City Milling Company.
22. Later, instead of being dropped directly into the river, this unused water
was run through penstocks into Niagara's Schoellkopf Plant. Niagara's right to so
collect and use this water was the subject of the litigation in Hydraulic Power Co. v.
Pettebone-Cataract Paper Co., 198 App. Div. 644, 191 N.Y. Supp. 12 (4th Dep't
1921), affirming 112 Misc. 528, 183 N.Y. Supp. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
23. The assets of Pettebone-Cataract were acquired by Niagara Lockport and
Ontario Power Company in 1925. At the same time all of the assets except the
water rights in issue were conveyed by Niagara Lockport to Niagara Falls Power
Co. in satisfaction of a $172,000 judgment held by the latter as a result of the litigation cited in note 22 supra. The water rights were rented to Niagara Falls
Power Co. in return for cut rate power to be delivered to Niagara Lockport. To
complicate the situation further, Niagara Lockport and Niagara Falls Power Co.
were both controlled during all the relevant times by the same parent, Buffalo
Niagara Electric Company, which in turn was consolidated into its parent Niagara
Mohawk in 1950.
24. Since Niagara Lockport had been merged with Buffalo Electric in 1945, the
latter was the seller to its subsidiary, Niagara Falls Power Company. The sale
was approved by both the SEC (under the Holding Company Act powers) and the
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Niagara or its predecessors have always satisfied in their own
names any necessary state or federal regulatory requirements covering
use of the International and Pettebone-Cataract water rights. However, the claims of the latter companies to these water rights have
long been a matter of public record. For instance, the FPC license
under which Niagara operates its project states that in regard to
recapture, or any other taking of the project by the United States
or another licensee:
"Such taking over of the project shall also be subject to the
rights, if any, of Pettebone-Cataract Paper Company and Cataract
City Milling Company to withdraw water at a rate not exceeding
265 cubic feet per second from the hydraulic canal or basin of
the licensee, and to the rights, if any, of International Paper
Company." 25

Of course a principal problem of this case is to determine -the
significance of the words "if any."
THE FEDERAL WATER POWER ACT OF 1920

The Federal Water Power Act, which is now Part I of the
Federal Power Act, was enacted in 1920 after many years of national
and congressional debate. 26 It provides for public and private development of water power primarily under federal supervision, 27 but
in some aspects there is ".

.

. careful preservation of separate in-

terests of the States throughout the Act, without setting up a divided
authority over any one subject." 25
New York Public Service Commission. See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC,
supra note 1, at 196. The purchase price was $728,415.28, which was stated to be the
cost of the water rights to Niagara Lockport, who was also the first person to
devote the property to public service. Thus there was no disallowance of the sales
price, despite the affiliation between buyer and seller. Actually that sum was the
exact amount paid for the Pettebone properties by Niagara Lockport in addition to
assumption of the judgment. However, if Niagara Falls did not need to acquire the
Pettebone rights to use the water (which is what the FPC contends) then it was
not necessary for it to pay over $728,000 for the fee for such rights, regardless of
what Niagara Lockport paid for them. Yet the FPC has not disallowed this item
from the project accounts; it has only disallowed the rentals paid until purchase of
the fee.
25. Transcript of Record, p. 27, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, supra
note 1 (italics added).
26. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 167 (1953); First
Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946); see KERWIN, FEDERAL
WATER POWER LEGISLATION (1926) ; Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Water
Power Legislation, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 9 (1945). Compare Brown, The Conservation of Water Power, 26 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1913).
27. Secretary of the Interior Houston stated when the Bill was under consideration: ".

.

. [the bill] proposes a method by which the waterpower of the country

. . . can be developed by public or private agencies under conditions which will
give the necessary security to the capital invested and at the same time protect and
preserve every legitimate public interest ...

"

H.R. REP. No. 61, 66th Cong.,

1st Sess. 5 (1919).
28. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Power Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 174 (1945).
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Although the Act recognizes state regulation to some extent,
the ultimate responsibility for development and use of water power
was consciously placed in the Federal Government and its agency
the FPC. For instance, the FPC decides who may develop a water
power site, and under what conditions, e.g., the size, type, and exact
location of a project. Rates are to be regulated by the FPC in absence
of state action in this field."
Even if state regulation is in effect,
the FPC may ultimately control the profits of licensed projects by
reason of the fact that at the expiration of a license the FPC must
determine whether or not earnings from the project have been excessive.3 0 Finances and accounting are also subjected to detailed federal
control.3 1
As mentioned, under the Act the United States, or a subsequent
licensee, may purchase or "recapture" a project at the end of the
license"2 (usually fifty years). The price to be paid is the "net
investment" of the licensee: the original cost of building the project
or its fair value at the time of recapture, whichever is lower, less
certain deductions.
Cost is the "actual legitimate original cost." I This is the
famous "original cost," the cost to the person who first devoted the
property to public service,34 and may be less than the actual cost to
the licensee. It does not include profits paid .to an affiliate on account
of the project; for instance, if an affiliate built the project, any profit
made by it would not be allowed as a "cost." This definition of
cost does not generally include any amount paid by the licensee which
is in excess of the project's cost of construction. This is true even if the
purchase was made in an arm's length transaction with a non-affiliated
company. Thus upon recapture no compensation will be paid for
increase in value due to changes in the price level, sales of the project,
or mere book write-ups.3 5 The Act also specifically excludes compensa29. Sections 19, 20, 16 U.S.C. §§ 812, 813 (1946).
30. Sections 3(13), 14, 15, 16 U.S.C. §§796(13), 807, 808 (1946).
31. Section 4(b), 16 U.S.C. §797(b) (1946); §301(b), 16 U.S.C. §825(b)
(1946) (formerly §4(f), but placed in §301 by amendment in 1935, 49 STAT. 839).
32. Section 14, 16 U.S.C. §807 (1946).
33. Section 3(13), 16 U.S.C. §796(13) (1946).
34. 18 CODE FED. REGS. § 101.3-3 (1949); Louisville Hydro-Electric Co., 13
FPC ANN. REP. 307, 314 (1933).
35. The interpretation announced by the Federal Power Commission of "actual
legitimate original cost!' as the cost to the person who first devoted the property to
public service has been upheld both as constitutional and a proper construction of the
Power Act. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 139 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 638 (1946) ; Niagara Falls Power Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 787
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 792 (1943) ; Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC,
129 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 761 (1943); Northern States
Power Co. v. FPC, 118 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1941); cf. United States v. New York
Telephone Co., 326 U.S. 638 (1946); Northwestern Electric Co. v. FPC, 321 U.S.
119 (1944) ; see Kripke, A Case Study in the Relationship of Law and Accounting:
Uniform Accounts 100.5 and 107, 57 HARv. L. REv. 433, 693 (1944).
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tion for good will, going value, or prospective revenues."6 The final
limitation on cost of the project, and one that is important to this
case, is that contained in section 14 of the Act:
cc."h.nor shall the values allowed in net investment for water
rights, rights-of-way, lands, or interest in lands be in excess
of the actual reasonable cost thereof at the time of acquisition by
the licensee." "
The principal deduction made from "original cost" (or fair value)
to determine "net investment" is the amount accumulated during the
period of the license from "earnings in excess of a fair return on such
[cost]." 38 Accordingly, if the consumers have been charged too
much during the licensed period, the price paid by the United States
is reduced by such excess, even if the rates collected were proper
under state law.3" Further, "earnings" are specially defined. That is,
36. Section 14, 16 U.S.C. § 807 (1946).
37. In the decision below (although not before the FPC, see note 43 infra) the
parties and the court assumed that the definition of "net investment" is the same
whenever used in administration of the Power Act, e.g., rate fixing, temporary taking,
amortization reserves, and recapture. This seems correct, since it greatly facilitates
uniform and simplified accounting throughout the life of a licensed project. But it
should be noted that this requires reading the limitations on net investment contained
in § 14 into § 3(13), which contains the primary definition of the term. Because
§ 14 applies to "values allowed" its limitations would apply, in determining earnings,
both to determination of capital costs and to allowance of operating expenses. Perhaps "reading in" is too strong a characterization since, as discussed below, § 14's
limitations may be merely an amplification of redundant statement of § 3(13)'s ceiling on allowable costs, that is, those which are "actual legitimate [and] original."
See notes 162 and 164 infra. In that case it would be preferable, though perhaps
inaccurate, to apply the limitation quoted in the text to determination of operating
expenses and thus earnings (not just to determination of capital expenses) as seems
to be the purpose of the limitation in § 3(13). However, if none of the constructions
indicated above to be preferable are upheld, then the issues discussed in this article
may not be completely ripe for decision in Niagara Mohawk which, after all, involves only creation of amortization reserves and determination of what are operating
expenses. Ripeness would await expiration of Niagara's license and recapture. Cf.
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. FPC, 169 F.2d 719, 724 (3d Cir. 1948). This
would mean that in regard to allowance for water rights expenditures, although
licensees would have to compensate those who own such rights under state law,
it would be unclear what part of such expenditures would be allowed in computation
of net investment in connection with matters such as rate making, temporary taking,
and creation of amortization reserves. And, upon recapture, herculean and deft accounting efforts would be needed to reconcile the previous allowance with the amount
that § 14 requires to be allowed in net investment upon recapture. This complexity
results because § 14's limitation of allowance of values for water rights is their
"actual reasonable cost," but it would apply only in the case of recapture. For all
other purposes of the Act, the definition of net investment in § 3(13) would be used,
and it does not specially deal with allowance of expenditures for water rights.
Such a jumble should be avoided if at all possible. Uniform accounting in respect to water rights can be accomplished by either of the two constructions suggested
above which link §§ 3(13) and 14. If either be adopted, net investment would
carry the same signficance throughout the Act, wherever used in administration of
a licensed project. Further, the question discussed in this article would be ripe
for decision in Niagara Mohawk.
38. Section 3(13), 16 U.S.C. §796(13) (1946).
39. Cf. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. FPC, 179 F.2d 179, 187 (3d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 957 (1950). But the licensee gets no relief if the
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some of the amounts included in the licensee's rates for depreciation, exhaustion, or replacement of plant may be treated as earnings. 40
The Act contains provisions to protect capital and prevent distribution of excess earnings as dividends prior to the end of the
license. Section 10(d) 41 requires that after the first twenty years
of operation of the project, the licensee shall place in an "amortization
reserve" a designated proportion (usually one half) of its subsequent
"surplus earnings" 42 made after that date which are in excess of a
certain rate of return on the net investment specified in the license
(usually 6%).43 This reserve is credited against the price to be paid
upon recapture. This specified rate of return is not necessarily the
same per cent as the "fair return," the size of which is determined
at the expiration of the license. 44
REGULATION OF NIAGARA BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

From 1900 until 1920 Niagara's predecessors used the water in
question under the authority of temporary federal permits. These
earnings were inadequate during the license period; he merely receives the original
cost or fair value of the project, whichever is lower. Puget Sound Power & Light
Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
40. Section 3(13) provides for the computation of net investment by deducting
from the "actual legitimate original cost" of the project the following items:
". .. to the extent that such items have been accumulated during the period of the
license from earnings in excess of a fair return on such investment: (a) Unappropriated surplus, (b) aggregate credit balances of current depreciation accounts,
and (c) aggregate appropriations of surplus or income held in amortization, sinking
fund, or similar reserves, or expended for additions or betterments or used for the
purposes for which such reserves were created. . .

."

The exact significance

of these provisions, covering the amounts in "current depreciation accounts" to be
deducted from project costs, has not been settled. See Judge Biggs' excellent discussion in Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. FPC, supra note 39, at 193-8; Hearings
before House Conmittee on Water Power, 65th Cong. 2d Sess. 38-9 (1918). But
cf. Niagara Falls Power Co., 9 F.P.C. 228, 243-4 (1950).
41. Section 10(d) provides in part: "That after the first twenty years of operation, out of surplus earned thereafter, if any, accumulated in excess of a specified
reasonable rate of return upon the net investment of a licensee in any project . . .
the licensee shall establish and maintain amortization reserves, which reserves shall,
in the discretion of the Commission, be held until the termination of the license or
be applied from time to time in reduction of the net investment. .. ."
42. This term is not specially defined by the Act or the regulations.
43. Before the commission, Niagara had argued that in computing net investment, excessive earnings made in the first twenty years of operation were not to be
deducted froin the cost of the project upon which future excessive earnings were to
be computed. This was because before the 1935 amendment to the Power Act,
§ 10(d) used the words, "actual legitimate investment" instead of "net investment,"
as the base for measuring excessiveness. But the commission correctly noted that,
according to its legislative history, the amendment was to insure that the standards
of definition of net investment in §3(13) be used as the base for the amortization
reserve; and that it probably could have been applied under the old language. See
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 129 F.2d 126, 133 (6th Cir. 1942). See also
SEN. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1935); H.R. REp. No. 1318, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1935)..
44. See 1 FPC ANx. REP. 59 (1921). It should be noted that the licensee
will be permitted to make up past deficiencies in earnings (below the rate specified
in his license) before any earnings in excess of the specified rate are placed in the
amortization reserve. See Niagara Falls Power Co., 9 F.P.C. 228, 256 (1950).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

40

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

permits all contained provisions which recognized that Niagara permitted the International Paper Company to use the water.4 5 The
last annual permit contained a provision for immediate termination
on the effective date of a Federal Water Power Act, if it became
effective within the year.4" The Act went into effect before the year
was up. In Niagara Falls Power Co. v. FPC,47 the Second Circuit
held that Niagara's plants were subject to regulation and licensing
just as any project built after the Act. It held that despite any rights
it had under state law, as against the Federal Government in 1920
Niagara did not. have any vested right to use the waters in question.4
The FPC Decision:--Niagara,the first licensee of the FPC, was
also the first ordered to create an amortization reserve under section
10(d) of the Power Act. This reserve was ordered created as of
March 1, 1941, twenty years after issuance of the FPC license. After
hearings, the FPC ordered Niagara to place in the reserve one half
of all its earnings in excess of six per cent made after March 1, 1941." o
The order went further. It disallowed as operating expenses
rentals paid for the International and Pettebone water rights and
directed that they be included in earnings made from March 2, 1941
Presumably the same result
through December 31, 1946." °
45. Permits covering the years 1900 to 1905 were obtained from the War DeThey authorized
partment pursuant to the Act of 1899, 30 STAT. 1121 (1899).
placement of certain structures in the River, but not diversion of the water. From
1906 to 1913, permits for use of water were obtained under the Burton Law, 34 STAT.
626 (1906), and extensions thereof, 37 STAT. 43 (1911), 37 STAT. 631 (1912). From
1917 to 1920 permission to use the water was given pursuant to congressional joint
resolutions. 39 STAT. 867 (1912); 40 STAT. 241 (1917); 40 STAT. 633 (1918); 41
STAT. 163 (1919).
(1919).
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 792 (1943).
F.2d
787
(2d
47. 137
46. 41

STAT. 163

48. The court found that the temporary permit did not confer such a right
since it expired the instant before the Act went into effect. Therefore Niagara
had no vested right to maintain the project as against the United States; it would
therefore be valued for recapture, or for determination of net investment, at "original
cost." Cf. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. FPC, 147 F.2d 743, 748-9 (7th Cir.
1947). If it had a vested right, § 23(a),, 16 U.S.C. § 816 (1946) of the Act requires
that the project be valued at its "fair value" as of the date the license was issued.
In regard to water rights, this would have meant that since they were vested as
against the United States, compensation would be required for their taking and
allowance therefor made in net investment. The Power Act seems to provide for
such compensation if the project is taken by the United States prior to expiration
of the license; that is, licensing completely vests water rights of limited duration
in the licensee. Section 14, 16 U.S.C. § 807 (1946) (proviso clause). Cf. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893).
49. Niagara Falls Power Co., 9 F.P.C. 228 (1950).
50. The International and Pettebone water rights were the only ones outstanding
in the Niagara area. The rights of other companies who had drawn water from
the hydraulic canal had been acquired by Niagara prior to issuance of the license.
See Niagara Falls Power Co., 9 F.P.C. 228, 252 (1950). See also note 158 infra.
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will follow (if the commission is upheld) for rentals paid after the
latter date; and rentals paid prior to 1941 will also be included
as earnings in the computation of any "excessive earnings" at the
time of recapture.5 1 That is, the result of this case will probably
be conclusive as to all rentals for water rights paid over the fifty
year period of the license. This amounts to about $5,780,000 in
this case.52
The rationale of the FPC decision was that the money spent for
these rentals was uselessly expended. Nothing was obtained, because
neither International nor Pettebone had anything to lease. The FPC
stated that International and Pettebone do not
"
. possess a lawful title to the water rights in question for
the reason that there cannot be private ownership of the waters
of a navigable river of the United States.
"It is .

. futile for [a] licensee to lease and pay rental for

rights it already owns under its license.
adjustment rests." '

On that basis the staff

The Court of Appeals Decision:--On appeal from the FPC order
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, per curiam, reversed,
Judge Bazelon dissenting. 4
51. These questions were of course not before the Commission for decision, but
they involve the identical issues of law and fact as the instant case.
52. This is computed on the basis of a rental of $99,000 a year for 50 years
(the license period) in regard to the International water rights, and $37,800 a year
for 22 years (1925-1947) for the Pettebone rights.
The FPC was
53. Niagara Falls Power Co., 9 F.P.C. 228, 252 (1950).
quoting from its decision in Niagara Falls Power Co., 6 F.P.C. 184, 186 (1947).
This was an application by Niagara, after its purchase of the fee to the Pettebone
rights, to have the clause in the license mentioning these rights deleted, that is, to
make these rights subject to the license. This clause is quoted in the text at note
25 supra. The FPC stated that it regarded the words as meaningless because
Niagara's rights to the water stemmed solely from its federal license. However, it
refused to grant the amendment because it thought such action might recognize the
necessity for Niagara to acquire the Pettebone rights. Niagara Falls Power Co.,
6 F.P.C. 184, 188 (1947). An exchange of correspondence revealed that the FPC
considered this action determinative of the issue involved in the instant case, and
consequently in its opinion and before the court of appeals it contended that the denial of the amendment was res judicata as to the unnecessary nature of Niagara's
expenditure for state created water rights. Niagara Falls Power Corp., 9 F.P.C.
228, 251-2; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC supra note 1, at 197. The
court below rejected this contention, and the ruling seems proper. Doctrines such
as collateral estoppel are reluctantly applied in regard to administrative agencies.
Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244, 246 ('D.C. Cir. 1947). It is also
doubtful that the FPC action denying the amendment was appealable as a final order,
for it lacked substantive effect. Section 6, 16 U.S.C. § 799 (1946), of the Power
Act provides that licenses may be altered only "upon mutual agreement between
the licensee and the Commission," which indicates that granting of the amendment
was purely a discretionary matter. The action of the FPC merely left the license
where it was, a state of affairs to which Niagara consented when it received the
permit4
54. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, mipra note 1. The majority consisted of Judges Kimbrough Stone and Wilbur K. Miller.
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The majority held that the International and Pettebone water
rights were valid "usufructuary rights," interests in real property which
could be leased to Niagara under New York law. Although these
rights were, and are, always subject to the servitude of the Federal
Government for purposes related to navigation, they were not
destroyed, either by the Treaty of 1910 or by the Power Act. A
licensee may not proceed to use the water just because he has a
federal license; it must comply with state property law in regard to
use of water.
"The Act is purely a regulatory measure. A federal license
is not an original grant of authority, but a permission to use
a state's grant of authority." 55
But the court went on to recognize that a federal license, as well as
rights under state (property) law, was needed to divert navigable
waters."8 In reaching its conclusions, the court relied on section 27
of the Act, which provides:
"Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as

affecting . . . the laws of the respective States relating to the

control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired
therein."
The court stated:
..
. The language of Sec. 27 is clear and unequivocal . . .
Congress did not intend the Water Power Act to destroy vested
property rights such as those here involved, but only to regulate
their exercise."

57

Accordingly, the majority held that since Niagara was required
by state law to compensate for its use of the International and Pettebone water rights, the leases in question were valid, and rentals paid
thereunder were to be allowed as operating expenses and not to be
included in earnings. In effect, this means that upon recapture the
United States must reimburse Niagara for these rentals.
55. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, supra note 1, at 207.
56. Ibid. "To be sure, a license is a pre-requisite in that water rights under
state law in a navigable stream may not be exercised without one...."
57. Id. at 205. The court also relied on other sections of the Act which mention
water rights, for instance § 14, which states that values allowed for "water rights"
in determining the net investment shall be limited to the "actual reasonable cost;"
§3(11), which includes "all water rights" in the definition of the licensed project
property; §4(b), which includes "water rights" as one of the items whose cost the
licensee must report to the commission; and § 9(b), which requires an applicant for
a license to show that he has complied with state law with respect to the "bed and
banks and to the appropriation, diversion and use of water for power purposes."
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In dissenting, Judge Bazelon asserted:
At least as applied to the United States or its licensee
as such, the Federal Power Act is an assertion of the commerce
power which constitutes a taking by the United States without
compensation of all water rights affecting navigable streams except to the extent and in the manner that the Act expressly saves
certain rights created under state law." 58
Contrary to the majority, he interpreted section 27 as not preserving
the water rights in question; it saves only water rights related to
irrigation or municipal uses. Therefore when section 14 refers to
compensation for water rights upon recapture, it does not save the
instant rights, for they are not related to irrigation or municipal
uses.59 He concluded that the water rights in question were taken
by the Act, and therefore no compensation would be paid for them
on recapture. The federal license was all that Niagara needed to
use the water.
In general, the position of this article is that expenditures by
Niagara for water rights should be disallowed only to the extent that
they are unreasonable in amount. But, before developing this thesis
it will help to summarize the settled law dealing with the interest of
the Federal Government in navigable waters.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF THE PROBLEM
Since Gibbons v. Ogden,s0 the commerce clause has been held

to give the Federal Government, or its instrumentality, power over
navigable waters. It has a servitude to use or regulate use of such
waters, including use of water to generate electricity."' It need not
compensate riparian owners whose utilization of the water is affected
by such federal use or regulation. 2 However, owners must be compensated for fast land (above the mean high water mark) taken or
affected, e.g., flooded."3 But the price to be paid for such a taking
need not include compensation for the value of the land as a water
power site.0 4 Thus were the Federal Government itself to develop
58. Id. at 209.
59. As for the other sections of the Act, cited by the majority as saving, or
mentioning, water rights, Judge Bazelon asserted that they relate only to filing
information with the commission and do not have the substantive effect of preserving
state created interests in water.
60. 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824).
61. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509 (1945).
62. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P., & P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941);
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 65 (1913).
63. See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509 (1945).
64. Washington Water Power Co. v. United States, 135 F.2d 541 (9th Cir.),
affirming 41 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Wash. 1941), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 747 (1943).
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water power such as that at Niagara, it would, in a condemnation proceeding, ".

.

.

have to pay the fair value, judicially determined, for

the fast land; nothing for the water power." ' As against the Federal
Government's navigation servitudes, there are no private property
rights in the flow of a navigable stream. But unless and until the
Federal Government has exercised this servitude by using the water
power or prohibiting its use by others, in order to use water power of a
navigable stream a person need only fulfill the requirements of state
law.66 Further, when it does exescise this servitude, the Federal Government may provide for limited or complete preservation of state
created interests in the water power or lands affected.T
In United States v. Chandler-DunbarWater Power Co.," Congress had directed the condemnation of certain lands in order to improve
navigation on the St. Mary's River. Water power produced by these
improvements was to be used to generate electricity. Compensation
was sought for the value of water rights and for the value as a power
site of fast land on the banks of the river. Denying these claims, the
Supreme Court held:
"This title of the owner of fast land upon the shore of a
navigable river to the bed of the river . . . is subordinate to
the public right of navigation, and . . . is of no avail against

the exercise of the great and absolute power of Congress over
the improvement of navigable rivers.
. "9
65. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 427 (1940).
See United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 805n. (1950) ; Note,
Federal Development of State Resources in 1 FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HoWE AND
BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307 (Temp. ed. 1952).

However, if federal action

in regard to a navigable stream affects the water rights of a riparian owner on a
non-navigable tributary, he is apparently entitled to compensation for loss of property.
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). Yet §23, 16 U.S.C. §817 (1946),
of the Power Act provides that under the commerce power such an owner's use of
non-navigable water requires an FPC license and submission to its attendant regulations. See Grand River Dam Authority, CCH FE. UTIL. LAW REP. 111 10,753,
10,757 (1953).
66. See, e.g., United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411,
418 (1926).
67. Cf. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 734-42 (1950)
(construing the Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. §§371 et seq.).
68. 229 U.S. 53 (1913). This was the only case cited by the FPC opinion in
support of its decision on the water rights here in issue. It is hardly on all fours
since it involved a project to be built by the United States; the Power Act only
involves federal regulation.
69. Id. at 62.

The Court continued:

"...

that the running water in a great

navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.

The Government had dominion over the water power of the rapids and
falls and cannot be required to pay any hypothetical additional value to a riparian
owner who had no right to appropriate the current to his own commercial use.
These additional values represent, therefore, no actual loss and there would be no
justice in paying for a loss suffered by no one in fact. . .

."

Id. at 69, 76.
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Subsequent cases have reached an identical result.70 It is also well
established that the United States need not compensate for water
rights even though it uses or leases the water power to generate electricity for sale.71 The Government need only show that the power
generation is part of a project connected with navigation.7"
Insofar as regulation of private water power projects are concerned, similar conclusions have been stated by the Court. For instance, in upholding the constitutionality of the Federal Power Act
itself Justice Reed said:
"..

In

our view, it cannot properly be said that the con-

stitutional power of the United States over its [navigable] waters
is limited to control for navigation .

.

.

the respondent cannot,

by seeking to use a navigable waterway for power generation
alone, avoid the authority of the Government over the stream.
That authority is as broad as the needs of commerce. Water
power development from dams in navigable streams is from the
public's standpoint a by-product of the general use of the rivers
for commerce."

78

Enactment of the Power Act partially exercised this broad federal
servitude over navigable waters. It is firmly settled that the Act
makes it necessary to comply with federal regulation, and to obtain a
federal license, in order to use the water power of navigable streams.
This requirement exists regardless of the fact that the prospective
user has fulfilled all the requirements of state property and regulatory
law in respect to such use." In addition, any conflicting state regulation of navigable waters must give way to FPC action. For instance,
a licensee may build a dam in a location approved by the FPC even
though he is forbidden to do so by the law or regulatory authorities
of the state.75
What has not been decided is the question presented by this case:
what state property rights in water power are destroyed or limited by
the Power Act or the grant of a license thereunder? Three possibilities present themselves: (1) A licensee under the Power Act
70. See notes 61 through 65 supra.
71. The power generated by the surplus water is held to be government property
the disposition of which is within the absolute discretion of Congress. United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 73 (1913). This is true
even if navigation is but an incident of a project, and its main purpose is power
generation. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 335 (1936).
72. For a discussion of the requisite connection with navigation, see United States
v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 737 (1950); Arizona v. California, 283
U.S. 423, 455-8 (1931).
73. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940).
74. E.g., United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 423
(1940); Niagara Falls Power Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 787, 791 (2d Cir. 1943).
75. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 164 (1946).
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need not acquire the property rights to water power required by
state law any more than it must comply with state regulatory directives as to where it may build its dam. (This is the position of
the FPC.) (2) A licensee must acquire such state created property
rights; the Power Act merely imposed an additional requirement
that federal regulation and licensing provisions also be satisfied before
navigable water is used. (This is the position of Niagara and the
court of appeals.) (3) The Act limited the types of state property
interests in water that need to be acquired by a licensee. It must
obtain only the right to use the water power for the licensed period.
That is, the issuance of a license destroys state property rights in
the water that would otherwise exist at the end of the licensed period.
(This is the position taken by this article.)
THE STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

AND

PETTEBONE

RIGHTS

UNDER NEW YORx LAW
In the court of appeals, the FPC contended that the International
and Pettebone interests in water were not recognized as property by
state law. The majority specifically decided otherwise. Judge Bazelon
in his dissent assumed this aspect of the majority decision to be
correct. In its petition for certiorari the FPC does not claim this
ruling to be erroneous, but in its brief the FPC in effect again raises
this issue. There may be some doubt as to the analysis of New York law
by the court of appeals. Determination of the status under New York
law of the water rights in question requires analysis of these water
rights in three respects: as against another private person who seeks
to divert the water; as against whatever interest New York has in
the water in its proprietary capacity; and as against New York in
its sovereign capacity seeking to regulate the use of the water, including imposition of charges therefor.
Private Persons:-Thereseems to be little question under New
York law that both the International and Pettebone rights are superior
as against interference by a stranger, e.g., a private person who seeks
to divert the river upstream from the International Paper Plant.
A full statement of New York law in this situation is found in a
case defining the water rights of the old Hydraulic Canal Company,
a predecessor of Niagara. There, the company had insisted that its
right to divert water from the Niagara River was only a franchise
from the state and therefore could not be taxed as real estate. The
court held otherwise:
" ..The relator, as a riparian owner and as owner of the
land under the waters of the Niagara River adjacent to its
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uplands from which the water is immediately taken, has the
right to the use of the waters of the river for manufacturing
purposes, and to divert the same for that purpose, returning them
to the river, as it does, after passing over its own lands [citations
omitted], subject only to the paramount right of the State to
utilize these waters for a public use, without compensation to
such riparian owners; all riparian rights remaining unimpaired
until the exercise of such paramount right by the State . . .
the relator, as riparian owner, had the right to take waters from
the Niagara River for manufacturing purposes, not interfering
thereby with the navigability of the stream, such right being in
no sense in the nature of a franchise but a corporeal hereditament,
not depending either upon grant or prescription." 7'
In later litigation, New York courts have specifically stated that the
Pettebone rights were private property:
" . The defendants [Pettebone-Cataract Company] . . .
are . . . owners of certain water rights, by virtue of which
they take and have for years taken quantities of water from such
[canal] basin and conducted the same to turbines upon their
properties and thereby generated electrical power for their own
private uses." 7'
The Supreme Court of the United States has held the International water rights to be property under the law of New York in
InternationalPaper Co. v. United States.7" This case arose because
in 1917 the United States requisitioned all the electric power that
could be produced by Niagara under its permit from the Secretary of
War. Since the requisition required Niagara, not International, to
use this water, the latter's plant was forced to shut down and International sought damages therefor. The claim was allowed by a
divided (6-3) Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment below.
Held, Justice Holmes, for the Court:
t. . the Government took the property that petitioner owned
as fully as the Power Company owned the residue of the water
in the canal. Our conclusion . . . is that the Government intended to take and did take the use of all the water power in
76. People ex rel. Niagara Falls Hydraulic Power and Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 70
App. Div. 543, 546, 75 N.Y. Supp. 1100, 1101 (4th Dep't 1902). New York Real
Property Law §2 specifically defines real estate so as to include a corporeal hereditament. See also Van Etten v. City of New York, 226 N.Y. 483, 486, 124 N.E. 201,
202 (1919) ; United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp and Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 38,
46-7, 123 N.E. 200, 202 (1919).
77. Hydraulic Power Co. of Niagara Falls v. Pettebone-Cataract Paper Co., 198
App. Div. 644, 646, 191 N.Y. Supp. 12, 13 (4th Dep't 1921). Niagara brought this
action to establish its right to utilize the balance of the water power head that remained after it ran throughout the Pettebone mill.
78. 282 U.S. 399 (1931).
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the canal; that it relied upon and exercised its power of eminent
domain to that end; that, purporting to act under that
power and no other, it promised to pay the owners of that
power.. . , 79
As a cautionary note, it is in order to observe that this case does not
decide the present one. Although it squarely holds that as of 1917-18
International had rights in the Niagara water which were recognized
by state law, it is not a holding that the Government must pay if it
appropriates these rights by exercise of the navigation power, which
power is the authority for the Power Act.
State Proprietary Interest:-The first way in which the state
might claim a proprietary interest is as a downstream riparian landowner. In 1884 the state acquired the land surrounding the Falls
themselves.8 0 Accordingly, Niagara's upstream diversion of water
reduces the volume flowing over the Falls and impairs New York's
riparian rights. New York has a second source of proprietary interest.
Under New York law the state in its proprietary capacity apparently
has the right to use both the flow of the Niagara River and its bed
without compensation and without regard to who owns the riparian
land."' However, these rights may be conveyed by the state8 2 or
lost by prescription,83 subject to a shadowy limitation that the public
trust must not be violated.

4

Insofar as the instant water rights are concerned, Niagara has
apparently obtained the necessary property rights from the State. 5
They are derived not only through the chain of title to Niagara's
79. Id. at 408 (Justices McReynolds, Stone, and Roberts dissented).
80. Matter of Commissioners at State Reservation at Niagara, 37 Hun 537
(N.Y. 1885), appeal disnzissed, 102 N.Y. 734, 7 N.E. 916 (1886). Early in the nineteenth century all the riparian land had been sold to private parties by the state.
81. Ibid. See People v. System Properties, 281 App. Div. 433, 440, 120 N.Y.S.2d
269, 279 (3d Dep't 1953). In the instant case the court of appeals was silent on this
aspect of New York law. It cited a number of cases which dealt only with non-tidal
streams in which New York has no proprietary right, e.g., Waterford Electric
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 208 App. Div. 273, 203 N.Y. Supp. 858 (3d Dep't
1924), af'd, 239 N.Y. 629, 147 N.E. 225 (1925).
82. First Construction Co. v. State, 221 N.Y. 295, 116 N.E. 1020 (1917);
Williams v. The Mayor, 105 N.Y. 419, 11 N.E. 829 (1887); Langdon v. The
Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129 (1883).
See Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy, 212
N.Y. 1, 8, 105 N.E. 849, 851 (1914), appeal dismissed, 242 U.S. 272 (1916).
83. Matter of Commissioners at State Reservation at Niagara, 73 Hun 537

(N.Y. 1885).

84. Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 8, 105 N.E. 849, 852
(1914); Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 185 Misc. 696, 57 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup.
Ct. 1945).
85. That Niagara, not the Pettebone and International Companies, obtained these
rights is of no matter. In fact it may well have been Niagara's obligation to take
such action, since it originally leased the water rights to International and Pettebone. What Niagara has been paying for is the surrender by these companies of
their rights under their lease or conveyance from Niagara.
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real property (including the water rights), but also by virtue of a
number of statutes authorizing its use of water." This conclusion
is illustrated by the company's litigation with the State Water Power
and Control Commission. In 1942 the commission attempted to
impose upon Niagara's use of the water a statutory "equitable rental"T
from which "lawfully and previously acquired" rights were exemptY.
In enjoining the commission, the New York Court of Appeals held
Niagara's use, and by implication the International and Pettebone
8
rights, to be within the exemption.
State Regulation:-In the last mentioned case, the New York
Court of Appeals qualified its opinion:
We make no determination as to the particular nature
and extent of the defendant's rights or privileges as acquired from
the State or as riparian owner, or as to the effect thereon of
the state's reserved right to control or regulate or license, through
appropriate legislation, the diversion of water from the Niagara
River." s'
Accordingly, the very next year the Conservation Law was amended
to eliminate the exemption from equitable rentals of rights "lawfully
and previously acquired." " Upon signing the bill Governor Dewey
stated, "This bill will bring to the State for the first time a reasonable
compensation for use of the water now being diverted from the
Niagara River." "1 Niagara promptly sought to enjoin imposition
of rent under this statute. Mr. Justice Bergan, sitting at Special
Term, decided for the state.92 He held that the rental was a proper
86. Statutes Authorizing Diversion for the Hydraulic Canal: N.Y. Laws 1886,
c. 83; N.Y. Laws 1889, c. 109; N.Y. Laws 1896, c. 968. Statutes Authorizing Di-

version for the (Original) Niagara Falls Power Co.: N.Y. Laws 1891, c. 253; N.Y.
Laws 1893, c. 477. Statute Authorizing Consolidation of Local Companies into
Niagara Falls Power Co. and Diversion of Water by it: N.Y. Laws 1918, c. 596, 597.
87. N.Y. CONSERVATION LAw, §634 (1928).
88. Water Power and Control Commission v. Niagara Falls Power Co., 289
N.Y. 353, 356, 45 N.E.2d 907, 908 (1942). This case actually covered only 15,100
c.f.s. of the 20,000 c.f.s. diverted by Niagara. In an earlier decision, it was held
that the 1918 statute, supra note 86, permitting the consolidation which formed the
Niagara Falls Power Company, was conditioned upon that company's agreement to
pay a rental on the balance of 4,900 c.f.s. of water diverted by it. Niagara Falls
Power Co. v. Water Power and Control Commission, 267 N.Y. 265, 196 N.E. 51
(1935).
89. Water Power & Control Commission v. Niagara Falls, supra note 88, at
356. Contrary to the quoted words the court did determine that Niagara had some
rights against the state which would appear to be of a proprietary nature.
90. N.Y. Laws 1943, c. 46.
91. The Governor's remarks are reprinted in 10 McKINNEY's CONSOLIDATED
456.
92. Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 185 Misc. 696, 57 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup.
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exercise of the "reserve" or "paramount" powers of the state which
existed over this natural resource."3 His decision was not appealed."
The decision seems correct, for if the state in its sovereign capacity
could prohibit use of the water, or use the water itself to generate
power, all without compensation, then imposition of a rental seems
justified as a milder exercise of sovereign power. But Justice Bergan
did not even imply that imposition of this rental absolved Niagara,
a private party, from respecting or paying for other private rights in
water used by its project. That is, payment of the state's charge
is an additional requirement to be complied with by the company,
just as it must pay corporation and real estate taxes.9 5
The FPC's position in the circuit court was that the International
and Pettebone rents, at least since the 1943 amendment to the Conservation Law, were paid to persons who had no interest in the water
under New York law. The state alone should have been paid for
it was the sole proprietor. Yet, the commission's own decision in
the instant case contradicts this contention. For the commission
allowed as operating expense Niagara's payment of $1,750,000 in
"equitable rentals" to the state. 6 Yet if these charges were imposed
by the state in its proprietary capacity, they should have been disallowed if the FPC is correct that the Power Act destroyed state created
property rights. Assuming that its allowance of the rents was
deliberate, the commission must have determined that New York law
imposes the equitable rental as a regulatory measure and further that
93. There is general language in the opinion about the state taking, or taking
back property rights. However, the decision seems to rest most firmly upon the
exercise of regulatory or sovereign power. This analysis is fortified by the fact that
there was no discussion of cases requiring compensation for water rights which the
state, having previously conveyed in a proprietary capacity, later seeks to appropriate
for a "non-public purpose." See note 82 supra. Further, there has been no direct
repeal of any of the laws (listed in note 86 supra) permitting Niagara to divert
water.
94. The majority in the instant case said that this unappealed decision represented ". . . not destruction, but confirmation of private rights." 202 F.2d 190,
201 (D.C. Cir. 1952). This characterization is a bit strong. But although the
New York case fails to explicitly confirm the instant water rights, it does not
purport to destroy them.
95. Cf. Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. (No. I and 2), 283 U.S.
291, 297 (1931). Of course it is true that the state's charge could be very high, as the
Justice observed; yet as he noted the state has in the past treated the company
fairly. Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 185 Misc. 696, 706, 57 N.Y.S.2d 777,
786 (1945). At any rate, pessimism as to the amount of "equitable rent" does
not destroy either the existence, or present value of water rights-"The fact that
the State might destroy relator's riparian rights does not convert such right into
a mere franchise. Interference with the relator's rights by the State is a contingency
too remote to require serious consideration." People ex rel. Niagara Falls Hydraulic
Power and Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 70 App. Div. 543, 546, 75 N.Y. Supp. 1100, 1102
(4th Dep't 1902). See also United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269
U.S. 411, 420 (1926).
96. Niagara Falls Power Co., 9 F.P.C. 228, 250, 261 (1950). Commissioner
Smith, who concurred, noted this inconsistency.
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this charge does not conflict with the Power Act. The corollary of
this result is that unless destroyed by the Federal Power Act, under
New York law, private rights in water still exist and consequently
had to be acquired by Niagara.
THE LIABILITY OF LICENSEES UNDER THE POWER ACT FOR STATE
CREATED INTERESTS IN

WATER

We pass to the question of whether the Act requires a licensee
to acquire such state created interests, regardless of whether payments therefor are to be allowed in his "net investment." Only if
the Act imposes such a requirement do we reach the determination
of what sums spent by a licensee for such interests will be allowed
in computing net investment.
As discussed above, the FPC, and Judge Bazelon in his dissent,
contend that the Power Act destroyed private interests in water other
than those related to irrigation or municipal uses. Therefore they
would completely disallow expenditures made by Niagara for such
(extinguished) water rights as the International and Pettebone interests. However, the majority held that the Act did not affect
the existing state created interests and, without discussion, assumed
that the United States must allow any sums spent by the licensee
in an arm's length transaction to acquire them. The position of this
article is that to the extent that a licensee's expenditures therefor are
to be allowed in computation of net investment these state created
interests survive the Act and licenses issued thereunder.
The legislative history that there is, negatives any Congressional
intent to completely destroy state created interests in water. An
oft-quoted spokesman for the Bill,97 Representative LaFollette, stated
at the outset of debate in the House of Representatives:
c . [we] are definitely insisting that the State's rules of
property as to water, bed and banks must have been fully complied
with or license can not issue.
.,, 98
On the other hand, it is true that section 27 which the majority
relied upon as saving the water rights here in issue, was apparently
97. Actually a number of bills for federal control of water power were introduced
and hearings held thereon in the sessions of Congress preceding the 66th Congress,
Second Session, when a conference bill was accepted and enacted into law. Since
the bills, especially that of the House, considered in the 65th Congress were very
similar to the one actually passed, Congressional statements in regard to them have
been given weight by the courts. See, e.g., First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v.
FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946). For a definitive history of the Congressional debates
and hearings, see, KERWIN, op. cit. supra note 26.

98. 56 CONG. REc. 9110 (1918). He was to be sure referring in this excerpt
to §9(b) which, in First Iowa, was held not to prevent issuance of a license
to an applicant who had not complied with state regulatory law. See text at note
111 et seq. infra.
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placed in the Act at the insistence of Representative Taylor who
stated that he sought to insure that the FPC would not have jurisdiction over diversion of water for irrigation purposes. 9 He does not
appear to have been interested in saving riparian rights such as existed
at Niagara Falls; and other Congressional statements make it clear
that diversions at Niagara Falls pursuant to such rights were to be
subject to FPC regulation.'0
But as to what state created interests in water must be acquired
by a licensee, we need not "extrapolate meaning from surmises and
speculation and free-wheeling utterances," or engage in "psychoanalysis of Congress." I'
A number of cases decided under the
99. 56 CONG. REc. 9912, et seq. (1918). See also, Rep. Mondell's remarks, 56
Rc. 9115 (1918). The amendment sponsored by Rep. Taylor was taken
from the Reclamation Act of 1902, but there are significant differences between the
two. See note 171 infra. It is also true that the Act covers any project which gathers
water for use in irrigation if it also involved any power production. See Rep.
Mondell's reluctant admission, ibid. Cf. Harris v. Central Neb. Pub. Power &
Irrig. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 425, 429 (D. Neb. 1938).
Prior to Taylor's amendment, which was placed in the bill by the House
Committee, the bill had been devoid of any special words saving private rights in
water. See, Hearings Before House Committee on Water Power, 65th Cong., 2d
Sess. 474-5, 619-23, 640-2 (1918). The bill, as it passed the Senate is found in 56
CoNG. REc. 225-7 (1917) ; the Senate Committee declared that it saved private water
rights, but did not say how. SEN. REP. No. 179, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1917). The
version submitted to the House by the President's Committee is found in H.R. REP.
No. 715, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 et seq. (1918). The House Committee took this
latter draft and wrote a compromise bill which is the most proximate ancestor of the
Power Act. As noted, it contained the present §27, 16 U.S.C. §821 (1946), but the
Committee report offers only a paraphrase of it in explanation, H.R. REP. No. 715,
65th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1918). Section 27, 16 U.S.C. §821 (1946), was subsequently
incorporated in the bills passed by both the House and Senate in the 66th Congress,
but the Committee reports again only paraphrased its language in explanation. H.R.
REP. No. 61, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1919).
100. KERWIN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 245-8. Originally the Niagara and all
other International Boundary Waters were excluded from the Power Act and placed
under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee. H. REs. 229, 65th Cong.,
2d Sess.; 56 CONG. REc. 844; Hearings, supra note 99, at 557 et seq. In the 66th
Congress, boundary waters were not so excluded. Further, Senator Wadsworth
obtained an amendment to §23(a) of the bill to insure that diversion of water at
Niagara Falls would be subject to FPC regulation. 59 CONG. R.c. 1482 (1920).
The amendment does not purport to take away any state-created property rights;
it provides that the Act "shall not be construed . . . as confirming or otherwise
CONG.

affecting any claim [to water]. . .

."

The Senate had inserted another amend-

ment which would have prevented the FPC from altering any contract for "power,
light, heat or water to be furnished from any project works." (Italics added). Its
principal purpose apparently was to prevent alteration of contracts by which Niagara
sold a disproportionate amount of the cheap electricity available at the Falls to a
few industrial customers. 59 CONG. REc. 1440, 1490-1 (1920).
The amendment
was rejected by the Conference Committee. H.R. REP. No. 910, 66th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1920). The Committee stated that the FPC should be able to exercise
the traditional power of a public service commission, to alter rate contracts which
are not in the public interest. There was no concern with the International and
Pettebone cases of contracts for delivery of water to a project. And it seems unduly
conceptual to say that by virtue of the series of transactions described in note 15
supra, Niagara first obtained the water, then delivered it to International under its
deed and lease, and then received it back under the lease here in issue.
101. These characterizations, those of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson respectively, are found in their concurring opinions in the recent case of United States
v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 321, 319 (1953). That case involved
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Power Act hold that a licensee must compensate owners of any state
created interests in water that are affected by his project, not just
those related to irrigation or municipal uses. Strangely, none of these
cases were cited by the majority in the instant decision and only
some of them were cited by the parties.
The first and leading case is Henry Ford and Son v. Little Falls
Fibre Co.10 2

There, operation of the licensee's project on the Hudson

River raised the water level of the Mohawk, a navigable tributary
about plaintiff's dam. This increased level diminished the head (or
fall) of water which furnished the power for the plaintiff's mill located
on the Mohawk. 10 3 In the New York courts the mill owner obtained
a judgment for damages and an injunction against future operations
decreasing the head. This judgment was unanimously upheld by
the Supreme Court of the United States. The then Justice Stone held:
"

. even though the rights which the respondents here assert

*

be deemed subordinate to the power of the national government
to control navigation the present legislation [the Power Act]
does not purport to authorize a licensee of the Commission to
impair such rights recognized by state law without compensation." 104
This conclusion was reached by reliance on sections 10(c) and 27 of
the Act. 10 5 Section 10(c) provides that licensees:
*

.

shall be liable for all damages occasioned to the prop-

erty of others by the construction, maintenance, or operation
of the project works

.

.

.

constructed under the license and

in no event shall the United States be liable therefor." 106
the construction of §20 of the Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §813 (1946). The concurring Justices felt that the Court reached its decision via an over-broad definition
of what is to be included within "legislative history."
102. 280 U.S. 369 (1930).
103. The increase in the level of the Mohawk apparently resulted from the
licensee's placing flashboards atop a dam owned by the United States. Although
it was authorized to do so by its FPC license, this authority does not clearly appear
in the summary of the license in 1 FPC AN. RE:,. 195 (1921) ; similar confusion
is found in Buchanan v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 791, 793-94 (1934). However,
use of the boards was specifically requested in the license application, and granted
by the FPC license after approval by the Army Engineers as required by § 18 of the
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 811 (1946). See Little Falls Fibre Co. v. Ford & Sons
Inc., 127 Misc. 834, 837, 217 N.Y. Supp. 534, 538 (Sup. Ct. 1926), aff'd, 223 App.
Div. 559, 560, 229 N.Y. Supp. 445, 448 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 249 N.Y. 495, 498-99, 164
N.E. 558, 560 (1928); Transcript of Record, pp. 22-29, 237, 244-45, Henry Ford &
Son v. Little Falls Fibre Co., supra note 102.
104. 280 U.S. 369, 377 (1930).
105. Justice Stone specifically refused to pass upon the contention of the New
York Courts that the defendant's liability could be alternatively predicated on the
ground that its license to generate power and use flashboards therefor was unrelated
to navigation. The later New River case specifically decided otherwise, that the Power
Act and licenses issued thereunder are a proper exercise of the navigation power.
See text at note 140 infra.
106. Judge Bazelon implied in the instant case (202 F.2d 190, 210 (D.C. Cir.
1952)) that the phrase saving the United States from liability meant that no
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Justice Stone held that the licensee, by accepting the license, had
agreed to comply with the section; it required him to pay for property
.rights of the plaintiff which had been damaged by operation of the
project. These rights, he held, had not been destroyed by the Act,
instead they were saved by section 27 (which has been previously
set forth).107 In this regard, Justice Stone held:
We think the interest here asserted by the respondents,
so far as the laws of the state are concerned, is a vested right
acquired under those laws and so is one expressly saved by Sec. 27
from destruction or appropriation by licensees without compensation .
,,108
This interpretation is in square conflict with that of the FPC and
Judge Bazelon, who contended that section 27 saved only water rights
connected with irrigation and municipal uses and therefore that
other interests in water are not within the compensation provisions
of section 14.1°1 It is also true that the Ford interpretation does
not conform with the purpose announced for section 27 by its Congressional author, nor did the Court in that case refer to the legislative history of the Act. However, Ford is in accord with the tenor
of the Congressional debates which demonstrated an intent to preserve
state property rights in water power. 110 It has been followed in a
number of instances which are discussed below.
allowance need be made for water rights even if they must be acquired by a licensee.
But §10(c), 16 U.S.C. §803(c) (1946), does not specify the types of property for
which the United States is not to be liable, so if the Judge's construction is correct,
no allowance need be made for any private property which the licensee must acquire.
This of course would be an erroneous construction, for certainly the licensee is to be
reimbursed for land and buildings that he must acquire for the project. See, e.g., § 14,
16 U.S.C. § 807 (1946). Accordingly, a proper construction of the phrase seems to
be that at the time of building the project the owner of private property must look
to the licensee, not the United States, for compensation, Buchanan v. United States,
78 Ct. Cl. 791 (1934), and the phrase has no relation to reimbursement by the United
States upon recapture. Cf. Pikes Rapid Power Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S. M.
Ry., 99 F.2d 902, 912 (8th Cir. 1938).
107. See text at note 56 =spra. On the other hand § 10(c) does not create a new
property right or cause of action; it only protects such property rights as are recognized by applicable state law. Rich Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Public Service
Authority, 216 S.C. 500, 522, 59 S.E.2d 132, 141 (1950); Alabama Power Co. v.
Smith, 229 Ala. 105, 110, 155 So. 601, 603 (1934) ; Miller & Lux Inc. v. San Joaquin
Light & Power Corp., 120 Cal. App. 589, 611, 8 P.2d 560, 569 (4th Dist. 1932),
aff'd, 8 Cal. 2d 427, 65 P.2d 1289 (1937).
108. 280 U.S. 369, 378 (1930).
109. That is, "other uses" at the end of § 27 refers only to other uses similar
to irrigation or municipal uses. See text at note 59 supra.
110. See, e.g., SEN. REP. No. 179, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1917)

"...

the bill

is so framed as to protect and maintain the rights of riparian proprietors over and
in the beds and waters of those [navigable] streams, and allow the full exercise
and enjoyment of the latter, subject to the paramount authority of Congress to
regulate the same for navigation purposes." This report dealt with the Senate
Bill which was weaker than that passed by the House in that it lacked any
equivalent of § 27 which was placed in the bill by the lower chamber. See also,
Statement of Rep. LaFollette, 56 CoNG. REc. 9108-12 (1918).
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The FPC relied on First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. V. FPC,"'
to support its position that the Power Act destroyed all private
water rights except those related to irrigation and municipal uses.
There, the law of Iowa would have prevented the applicant for a
license from building a dam which diverted waters of the Muscatine
River above its juncture with the Mississippi, and returned them to
the Mississippi via a canal some distance below the junction. Iowa
law would not permit the resultant drying up of the Muscatine between
the dam and the River's junction with the Mississippi.' 12 This location of the dam, however, apparently was the only one to which the
FPC would give approval." 8 Nevertheless, the FPC denied the license
because of section 9(b) of the Act which provides that a license
applicant must submit:
"Satisfactory evidence that [it] . . . has complied with the
laws of the State . . . with respect to bed and banks and to
the appropriation, diversion and use of water for power purposes
. "
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FPC must exercise its
independent judgment as to whether such a diversion of the Muscatine's waters was desirable, and if it decided it was, a dam might
be built, regardless of Iowa law."' Justice Burton, writing for the
majority "5 held that neither section 9(b) nor 27 saved state regulatory legislation. In regard to section 27 he said:
"The effect of Sec. 27 in protecting state laws from supersedure,
is limited to laws as to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water in irrigation or for municipal or other uses
of the same nature." 116
111. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
112. IowA CoDE § 469.5 (1946) (formerly IowA CODE c. 363, § 7767 (1939)).
113. See, First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop., 6 F.P.C. 227, 229 (1947).
114. The FPC subsequently granted a license, 6 F.P.C. 227 (1947) and this
action was affirmed on appeal, Iowa v. FPC, 178 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 979 (1950). See also, City of Tacoma, 92 P.U.R. (N.S.) 79 (FPC 1951) ;
Portland General Elec. Co. 92 P.U.R. (N.S.) 247 (FPC 1951). Similar problems
are found in ICC regulations. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Daniel, 333 U.S.
118 (1948).
115. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the Iowa courts should
first construe the pertinent state statute prior to the FPC action on the license
application. Since the FPC sought to postpone its decision until Iowa law had
been so determined, its refusal of the license should be upheld. See First Iowa
Hydro-Electric Coop., 4 F.P.C. 27, 31-2 (1944).
However, the FPC appears
to have sought a decision in the federal courts on supersedure by the Power Act,
rather than an interpretation of state law by the Iowa courts.
116. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 175 (1946).
To support this statement the early case of Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co.,
283 Fed. 606, 619 (D.C. Ala. 1922) was cited, where the court did apply the
rule of ejusmdem generis, to construe .the phrase "other uses" in section 27, thus
limiting its effect to uses similar to irrigation or municipal uses. That opinion,
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Despite this language, the majority in the instant case, strangely
stated that FirstIowa when combined with section 27 made ".
. it
clear beyond peradventure that Congress did not intend the . .
Act to destroy vested property rights such as those here involved, but
only to regulate their exercise." 1'7
Justice Burton, of course, did not say this. On the other hand,
his remarks in First Iowa as to the effect of section 27 are not decisive
since they were only dictum. The only reason he referred to section
27, was to hold that it had no relation to saving or destroying state
regulation, rather, "[s]ection 27 expressly 'saves' certain state laws
relating to property rights as to use of water .
, 118 The question
before the Court then did not involve state property rights, rather
it was a case of square conflict between state and federal regulation.
Section 9(b) was held to permit the FPC to require a license
applicant to submit information as to the extent of his compliance
with state law; but the section did not prevent issuance of a license
to an applicant who had not so complied. This did not mean that
such a licensee would not have to comply with any state laws relating
to use of water; rather as each question arose, the effect of the Power
Act on the state law would be passed upon:
"When this application has been remanded to the Commission,
that Commission will not act as a substitute for local authorities
having jurisdiction over such questions as the sufficiency of the
legal title of the applicant to its riparian rights . . . The references made in 9(b) to beds and banks of streams, to proprietary
rights to divert and use water . . . neither add anything to nor
detract anything from the force of the local laws, if any, on
these subjects. In so far as those laws have not been superseded
by the Federal Power Act, they remain as applicable and effective as they were before its passage." 119
At any rate, prior to FirstIowa the Supreme Court had determined
in Ford that a licensee must acquire property rights necessary under
however, does not make it clear how this section was applicable to the principal
issue before the court, namely the constitutionality of the Power Act. Apparently
all the court, which cited no legislative history, held was that section 27 did not
bar federal regulation of navigable waters to generate electrical power, even though
the state has been or is regulating such activity. Interestingly, the opinion stated
(at p. 620) that fishing rights recognized by state law were saved by §27, a
position recently rejected without discussion by the FPC in the cases cited supra
note 114.
117. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, supra note 1, at 205.
118. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 175 (1946)
(italics added).
119. Id. at 178. See also Iowa v. FPC, 178 F.2d 421, 427 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 979 (1950).
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It is submitted

that this decision and cases following it, were not to be silently cast
away by the quoted dictum limiting the "saving" power of section 27.
Justice Burton did not cite Ford, or cases which follow it; yet all
of them are contrary to the FPC's contention that First Iowa decides
that the Act is to be construed as destroying all state property rights
in water save those related to irrigation and municipal uses. Further,
a ruling that a licensee must pay for state created water rights used
by him, does not create any divided authority over water power development, a situation which Justice Burton held the Power Act
sought to avoid. 2 ' To be sure the cost of development will be somewhat increased by such payments, but this observance of interests long
locally recognized is far different from preventing the construction
of any dam at all, which would have been the result of a contrary
decision in First Iowa. However, in its brief before the Supreme
Court, the FPC, for the first time, argues that allowance of the rentals
here in issue would run contrary to the purposes of the Power Act:
this added cost of water power projects will increase both rates and
the recapture price. 120 a This argument assumes, as does that of Niagara,
that the Act cannot be construed to afford limited recognition of state
created water rights coupled with a congruent limit on reimbursement
of amounts spent by a licensee therefor. This article sets forth such an
intermediate position; it would not lead to an unreasonable increase
in project costs or operating expenses.
The interpretation of First Iowa set out above is supported by
the later decision in Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro,'21
in which Mr. Justice Burton also wrote the majority opinion. There
a licensee condemned in a state court, and under state law (as a state
created public utility), a site for a water power project. It was
ordered to pay for the value of the land as a power site, that is to
pay for the value of the right to use the water appurtenant to the
land. The judgment was affirmed by a divided (5-4) Supreme Court.
The decision appears based on the grounds that if the licensee chose
to condemn under state law, he must pay values allowed by that
law. If it had condemned under the power of condemnation given
by the Power Act, the result might have been different. Said the
majority ".

.

. we express no opinion upon what would be the

appropriate measure of value in a condemnation action brought by
120. Id. at 168.
120a. Brief for Petitioner, p. 24, FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Co., U.S.
Sup. Ct., Oct. 15, 1953.
121. 335 U.S. 359 (1948).
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the United States or by one of its licensees in reliance upon rights
derived under the Federal Power Act." 122
The obligation of the United States to allow expenditures for
water rights in computing "net investment" is indeed an open question.
But it does not seem open to question, that a licensee must pay something for state created interests in water appropriated by his project.
For if First Iowa is to be interpreted as the FPC here urges (and
as did the dissenting Justices in Grand River " ) then the Act destroyed
all state created interests in water, and in Grand River the condemned
lands possessed no special values for use as a water power site since
the condemnee lacked a federal license. Yet, this interpretation and
conclusion was rejected; Justice Burton held:
It is clear that the Federal Power Act cannot be said
to have so far affected the use of this land for a power site as
to destroy or otherwise render valueless the owner's right to
use it for that purpose. That Act merely has attached conditions
to the use of the land for a power site." 124
Therefore, unless Ford and cases following it have been overruled, sub
silencio, it seems settled that a licensee has an obligation to pay for private rights in water affected by his project.'25 The following brief account of the decisions which followed Ford indicates a body of law impressive enough to require direct overruling.
The first case is United States v. Central Stockholders' Corp.'25
There, a licensee had proceeded in the state court to condemn the rights
of riparian owners that would be affected by the dam which it had a
license to build. The United States sued to enjoin this proceeding and
quiet its alleged title to the waters. It asserted that the licensee needed
only its federal license to use the water and unless the state condemnation proceeding was stopped, the Federal Government upon recapture
would have to reimburse the licensee for sums it unnecessarily spent for
state created water rights. (Of course this is the same argument that
the FPC has made in the instant case.) The court refused to enjoin the
122. Id. at 373. This question is involved in the instant case, see text at note
185 et seq. infra.
123. The dissenting opinion was by Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices
Black, Murphy and Rutledge. They asserted that the consequence of the decision
"isto give private parties an entrenched property interest in the public domain,
which the Federal Power Act was designed to defeat." Id. at 376.

124. Id. at 372.
125. The only question that appears to be open in regard to these cases is
the extent to which a licensee must pay for state water rights; that is, does the
Power Act provide a special method for their valuation. This article suggests
that it does provide such a method, and that compensation is to be limited to
the amount to be allowed the licensee for such water rights in determining his net
investment.
126. 52 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1931).
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licensee's condemnation proceeding. It held that Ford decided that
regardless of the fact that the United States itself could have taken the
water without compensation, or perhaps delegated this power to a
licensee,12 7 it did not do so by the Power Act.' 28 This, it said, was
shown by section 10(c), set forth above. 2 9 Held the court:
" . . . The law expressly recognized all private rights established

and determined by the law of the state and expressly requires the
permittee where it interferes with such rights to compensate the
owner therefor." '3D

In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Washington Electric Co.,'
the Supreme Court of Washington in a carefully considered opinion
reached a result similar to Ford. The licensee had agreed to reimburse a railway for any damage caused by licensee's dam. But when
a flood caused by operation of the dam washed out the railway's tracks
the licensee refused to pay the costs of repair. It argued that the tracks
rested on fill which was illegally in place because it was an unlicensed
obstruction of a navigable stream, to whose waters the licensee had the
right of use without compensation for property rights affected. This
defense was rejected on the grounds that at least vis a vis the licensee
the Power Act did not destroy the property rights the railway had
under state law to obstruct the river. 3 2 Judgment for the railway was
affirmed.133

127. Cf. Buchanan v. United States, 78 Ct. CI. 791 (1934), which was cited
by neither the court nor the parties below. In Buchanan, the Government, for navigation purposes, had built a dam on the Ohio River; and the FPC had licensed
a private corporation to generate electriciy at the dam by use of flashboards.
Relying on Ford, plaintiffs, upper riparian land owners, sued the United States
for loss of undeveloped water power. Ford was properly held not applicable for
the reason that in Buchanan the defendant was the United States. Its building of
the dam was a proper exercise of the navigation power, and under Chandler-Dunbar
compensation need not be made for water rights thereby destroyed. These cases
point up the difference between the use by the United States or its instrumentality
and use by a licensee. If the use is as an instrumentality of the United
States compensation appears unnecessary. Cf. Susquehanna Power Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n (No. 1), 283 U.S. 291, 297 (1931) (two cases). Like Central
Stockholders, Buchatan and the other cases cited in this section do not pass on
whether or not a licensee's expenditures for water rights need be allowed by the
Government in computation of net investment.
128. Necessarily the court also decided that the United States did not have
title to the water power rights in question, rather it had only a servitude which
had not been exercised by passage of the Power Act. By contrast, in a recent
opinion involving the same licensee, the FPC held that the United States had
property rights in water power, but this was by reason of ownership of appurtenant
lands. Southern California Edison Co., 8 F.P.C. 364 (1949).
129. See text at note 106 sitpra.
130. United States v. Central Stockholders' Corp., sitpra note 126 at 332.
131. 197 Wash. 627, 86 P.2d 208 (1939).
132. This Washington case, not cited by the court or parties below, also
rests on the alternative ground that the licensee had by contract with the railroad
agreed to make good any damage caused by its project.
133. Accord, Pikes Rapids Power Co. v. Minneapolis St. P. & S.S.M. Ry.
99 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1938).
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In Alabama Power v. McNinch,3 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, reversed the FPC and directed it to allow as a
project cost, moneys paid to purchase water rights which appear to have
borne no relation to irrigation or municipal uses.3 5 This was done
without discussion of the possibility that the Act rendered it unnecessary for licensees to acquire and pay for such water rights.3
In the
same manner in a number of cases the FPC itself has allowed expenditures for water rights not related to irrigation or municipal uses 3 7
And a thorough investigation reveals no case in which it has disallowed
any part of a sum paid for land on the grounds that it represented values
attributable to the land's use for power purposes, i.e., the right to appurtenant water power.
Besides FirstIowa, the FPC relied on two other cases to support
its contention that the Power Act destroyed all rights to water power except those given by the federal license. These cases were New River,13 8
and the previously mentioned NiagaraFalls" 9 decision. These cases
did not deal with the obligation of the licensee to compensate persons
who had water rights under state law. They did not cite Ford, or cases
following it. They did not pass on the necessity under the Power Act
for a licensee to comply with state property or regulatory law. They
held only that, by itself, such compliance is not enough, as against the
federal government, to maintain a power project in navigable waters.
After passage of the Power Act, submission to federal regulation, including licensing, would be required.
New River was the great test case involving the constitutionality
of the Power Act.'
The Court upheld the Act as a valid exercise of
the navigation power. It upheld the requirement that a licensee submit to federal regulation and accept a license prescribed by the Act; it
also upheld recapture upon payment of the "net investment" even
though that sum might be less than the fair value of project at the
time of recapture. Therefore, even though it had complied with all
134. 94 F.2d 601, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 652 (1942).
135. On remand, the FPC allowed the expenditures, Alabama Power Co.,

2 F.P.C. 312, 318-22 (1940).

136. Judge Bazelon stated that this decision conflicted with his interpretation
of late Supreme Court decisions and could not be followed. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp. v. FPC, supra note 1, at 210.
137. Carolina Power Co., 4 F.P.C. 1110, 1114 (1945); Clarion River Power
Co. 1 F.P.C. 269, 298 (1935); Columbia Ry. & Nay. Co., 1 F.P.C. 78, 86-7
(1933).
Cf. East Bay Municipal Dist., 1 F.P.C. 12, 13 (1932). These cases
were not cited by the court or parties in the case below.
138. Unifed States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (New
River Power Project).
139. See text at note 47 .sipra.
140. In an earlier case, New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328 (1926), the
Act was challenged but the case was dismissed as presenting an abstract question.
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the applicable property and regulatory provisions of state law, the
Appalachian Electric Co. was enjoined from building a dam without
obtaining a federal license. But the Court did not pass on whether or
not a licensee must satisfy these requirements of state law to use the
waters licensed by the FPC.
As related earlier, the Second Circuit NiagaraFalls decision held
that despite compliance with New York law, Niagara's project was,
as against the Federal Government, illegally in place when the Power
Act went into effect. Therefore, Niagara had to accept a license based
on "original cost," not fair value at the time of licensing. This meant
that large sums had to be written out of Niagara's plant accounts since
there were amounts paid for the plant in excess of its "original cost."
In the instant case, the FPC relies particularly on the following
statement in Judge Learned Hand's opinion:
"When Congress passed the Federal Water Power Act in 1920
. . . the petitioner's slate was wiped clean, it stood at discretion,
as far as any federal rights of diversion. Congress had absolute
power to stop it from taking any water whatever or to impose
what terms it chose .

."141

Use of the phrase "federal rights of diversion" indicates that Judge
Hand recognized that state created rights also existed. He did not hold
that the latter rights no longer need be acquired by a licensee. He
ruled only that, by themselves, such rights were not enough once the
Power Act went into effect. Niagara had to comply with federal regulation and licensing in order to operate its project. This is far different
from the FPC interpretation of the case, i.e., that it held that state
created rights were totally destroyed, so that a licensee need not compensate persons whose interest in waters are appropriated by his
project. If he had intended to reach such a conclusion, Judge Hand
probably would have discussed Ford and similar cases as well as sections 10(c) and 27 of the Act, upon which they rested; he did not do
this."
By contrast, Judge Hand was very clear on the point that federal
regulation under the Power Act did invalidate part of a transaction valid
141. Niagara Falls Power Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1943).
142. Conceptually it is true that Judge Hand held that the Power Act
partially destroyed state created interests in water; at least to the extent that
they were no longer sufficient in and of themselves for their owner to operate a
water power project. That ruling does not mean, however, that a stranger who
obtains a license need not compensate the owner of state water rights. A similar
situation occurs under the Communications Act. One who owns the necessary
equipment may not send out programs unless he has a federal license. But an
FCC licensee cannot operate a station unless he acquires the necessary equipment
in transactions valid under state law. See, Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326
U. S. 120, on remnand, 146 Neb. 429, 19 N.W.2d 853 (1945).
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under state law by which Niagara acquired certain properties. This
transaction was destroyed or disallowed, for purposes of determining net
investment, to the extent that Niagara had paid more than the "original
cost" of the properties. This last mentioned ruling illustrates that the
court of appeals in the instant case read Judge Hand's opinion too narrowly when it said:
" . . . rights acquired from the State of New York necessarily
yielded to what the Commission may do only when the regulatory
actions of the State and national governments conflict as in the
First Iowa case." 14
Certainly New York property law yielded to the "original cost" ruling,
a regulatory action of the FPC under the Power Act. 1 "
1910 INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY TREATY AND WATER RIGHTS
In the instant case, the FPC alternatively contended before court
of appeals that the 1910 Treaty destroyed all state created water rights
in the Niagara River.'45 The majority rejected this contention, and
the point was not mentioned in the dissent. It is true that Judge Hand
had said:
"The United States was then allotted (by the Treaty) the privilege
of diverting within the State of New York from above the Falls
'not exceeding in the aggregate a daily diversion at the rate of
*
twenty thousand cubic feet of water per second'. When Congress
set up the Commission with power to issue licenses for the 'utilizaTHE

tion of power . . . from . . . any of the navigable waters of the
United States . . . ' the Commission was vested with the distri-

bution of this allotment, and any rights acquired from the State of
New York necessarily yielded to what it might do."'"
It is certainly true that regardless of rights possessed under state
law, the FPC is the policing agency to insure that not more than 20,000
c.f.s. of water are diverted; and that under the Power Act a federal
license is required to divert any water at all. But this does not mean
that compensation need not be paid if, in diverting the 20,000 c.f.s., a
143. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, supra note 1, at 207 (italics added).
144. The majority also attempted to distinguish the opinion on the grounds
that the issue before the court was capitalization of assets, whereas the instant
case deals with allowance of operating expense. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
v. FPC, mcp'ra note 1, at 200. This distinction lacks substance, for both determinations affect the size of the net investment, that is, to determine this latter
figure, the FPC must ascertain both the cost of the project (capitalization of assets)
and the amount of money earned by it (receipts less operating expenses). See text
following note 147 infra.
145. The FPC based this contention on Niagara Falls Power Co. v. FPC,
137 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1943). Commissioner Smith concurred in the FPC
decision only because he thought the Second Circuit Niagara Falls decision held that
the treaty of 1910 destroyed all state created water rights in the Niagara River.
Niagara Falls Power Co., 9 F.P.C. 228, 260-1 (1950).
146. Niagara Falls Power Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1943).
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licensee appropriates state created water rights. The Treaty itself indicates a desire to avoid destruction of state created rights in that the signatory countries wished:
" . . . to accomplish this object [of controlling diversion] with
the least possible injury to investments which have already been
made in construction of power plants on the United States side
of the river under grants of authority from the State of New
York. .... ",147
ALLOWANCE IN DETERMINATION OF NET INVESTMENT OF A LICENSEE'S EXPENDITURE FOR STATE CREATED INTERESTS IN WATER POWER.

We have seen that under the Power Act and the law of New York,
Niagara must pay for use of the International and Pettebone water
rights. In the court of appeals both the parties and the court largely
assumed that the problem of the case ends there and that Niagara's expenditures for water rights are to be either completely allowed or disallowed in determining net investments. This article now seeks to
show that the analysis must go further; that a licensee's expenditures
for water rights may be only partially allowable. Despite its obligation
to acquire state created water rights, there is a limit on the sum a
licensee should pay for them. This ceiling is identical with the extent
to which the government must allow these expenditures in net investment. Payments above this amount by a licensee are unnecessary and
should be disallowed. Finally, it is immaterial whether the expenditures were made to acquire the fee or a fixed term, or whether as in this
case a yearly rental was paid. Both methods of payment affect the
size of the net investment. If a lump sum was paid, the question is

what part is to be allowed as a project cost: if a rental was paid, what
part is to be allowed as an operating expense with the remainder to be
disallowed and added to earnings.
The FPC Contention:-The FPC contends that no part of a licensee's expenditures for necessary state water rights is to be allowed:
c . . .even if it is assumed [contrary to our contentions] that the

Federal Power Act did not wipe out state water power rights as
between private parties, it does not follow that the Act did not wipe
out those rights as between the licensee and the United States and
its regulatory agency." 148
In support of this view, the FPC cites Regent of the University System
of Georgia v. Carroll.'4 There, the FCC determined that a contract
147. International Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, Article V, 36 STAT. 2448,
2450 (1909). See also Article VII of the treaty, id. at 2451.
148. Petition for Certiorari filed by FPC, p. 27, FPC v. Niagara Mohawk

Power Corp., 345 U.S. 955 (1953).
149. 338 U.S. 586 (1950).
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whereby a licensee paid out part of its profits to a third party violated
the Communications Act. It directed the licensee to repudiate the contract if it wanted to retain or renew its license. This was done, but a
judgment awarding damages for breach of contract obtained by the
third party in the state court was unanimously affirmed by the Supreme
Court. The Court assumed that the contract violated the Communications Act, but besides the fact that the plaintiff was not a party to the
FCC proceeding, the Court found that the FCC had no power under
the Communications Act to destroy all rights under the contract. Its
power was limited to granting or denying a license. It is true that if
the FPC proposal quoted above is adopted, the end results of Regents
and this case would be similar; Niagara would be liable for appropriation of water rights under state law, but the Federal Government would
not recognize this liability in determining net investment. 50 But first
we must examine the provisions of the Power Act which specifically
deal with this problem of allowance of expenditures for state water
rights. We shall see that unlike the Communications Act, the Power
Act does not entirely outlaw or refuse to recognize the state created
rights in question.
The Power Act's Provisions For Allowance of Expenditures for
Water Rights:--Section 14, which specifies the method of determining
the price to be paid upon recapture, requires payment of the "net investment" as defined elsewhere in the Act ' and further provides that:
"Such net investment shall not include or be affected by the value
of any lands, rights of way, or other property of the United States
licensed by the Commission under this Act, by the license or by
good will, going value or prospective revenues; nor shall the values
allowed for water rights, rights of way lands or interests in lands
be in excess of the actual reasonable cost thereof at the time of
acquisition by the licensee."
Thus on its face, the Power Act allows reimbursement to the licensee
for sums he spent to acquire state water rights.152 We have seen, contrary to the contention of FPC, that the licensee must pay for any
state water right affected by the project, not just those related to irrigation and municipal uses.
150. A similar result occurs in federal tax cases where transactions valid under
state law may be disregarded for federal tax purposes. See Note, The Commissioner
Unbound, 61 HARv. L. Rxv. 1033 (1948).
151. In this connection see note 43 supra.
152. Cf. Remarks of Rep. LaFollette, 56 CONG. REc. 9111 (1918) : "If the Government desires to become the operator of the plant, we capture by paying actual reasonable cost [of] any land and riparian rights the licensee owns, and the net investment he has made in the plant."
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However, the FPC anticipates that the licensee's obligation may
be as broad as we have found it. It suggests that, regardless of the
interlocking of sections 14 and 27, there is some overriding consideration which requires disallowance of water rights expenditures; that
the Act places the
"United States in a completely different position from that enjoyed by private parties

. .

. [and the] . . . United States is con-

cededly the ultimate owner of all water rights in navigable
streams ....

,158

This statement seems incorrect. We have seen that section 14 requires
reimbursement for all state water rights. The United States does not
"own" water rights except those which are incident to government
owned land."5 4 It has a servitude by which it may control or regulate
the use of navigable waters, or use them itself, all without charge. But
unless and until it takes such action, state water rights are supreme.
It is doubtful that the FPC seriously contends that the United States
is a landlord in regard to navigable waters. If it does, it should claim
that expenditures for water rights be disallowed under provisions of
section 14, excluding from net investment, " . . . lands, rights of way

or other property of the United States licensed by the Commission."
There is no significant legislative history on the extent to which
the Government must reimburse a licensee for its required water rights
expenditures.' 55 Nor are there judicial decisions directly in point.
However, the Government's position in Central Stockholders appears to support the interpretation of the Act here advanced:
"The government . . . claims in its complaint herein, that any

judgment so rendered in the condemnation proceedings, although
first paid by the permittee, will subsequently fall upon the government at the expiration of the permit, for the reason that at that time
the federal government is authorized to take over the project of
the permittee upon payment of a reasonable value thereof which
153. Petition for Certiorari filed by FPC, p. 28, FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 345 U.S. 955 (1953).
154. If it "owned" the water rights, the government would not have lost the
Inter ational Paper case, International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399
(1931). See, United States v. Central Stockholders' Corp., 52 F.2d 322 (1931). Cf.
Susquehanna Co. v. State Tax Comm'n (No. 1), 283 U.S. 291, 297 (1931) (two
cases).
155. At one point during consideration of the bill by the House in the 65th
Congress, the limitations of § 14, 16 U.S.C. §807 (1946), on allowance of the value
of lands and water rights and the exclusion of the value of government property
were both eliminated. H.R. REP. No. 715, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 36 (1918). See,
Hearings before House Committee on Water Power, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 455-6, 6645 (1918). The reason for this is not clear. Apparently, the deletion was rescinded
after protests from Representative Ferris, a member of the committee, who, nevertheless, filed a minority report on the bill. See, KERwIr, op. cit. supra note 26, at
228 et seq.
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will probably include expenditures made by the permittee in the
acquisition of the alleged [water] rights of the Central Stockholders' Corporation of Vallejo." "16
The existence and nature of the Federal Government's obligation in this
respect was specifically left open in Grand River.1
LIMITATION OF ALLOWANCE FOR WATER RIGHTS

If the above analysis of the Power Act is correct, the United States

must allow in determining "net investment," Niagara's expenditures
for water rights. However, section 14 also limits this obligation to
the
.

. actual reasonable cost [of water rights, lands and rights

of way] at the time of their acquisition by the licensee.
The same limitation applies to lands and rights of way. Accordingly,
it appears, and will be assumed in the discussion below, that any amount
paid by a licensee for lands which is in fact due to the water rights attached to the lands will be treated the same as amounts paid for severed
water rights. However, the FPC appears never to have sought to
disallow part of the price paid by a licensee for lands, on the grounds
that it represented payment for water rights attached to the land. If
the FPC prevails in the Niagara case, which deals only with severed

water rights, it may well proceed along this land cost front. 5 '
Before passing to a detailed discussion of the limitation "actual
reasonable cost," it must be observed that this ceiling imposed on particular items of property necessary for a project, is in addition to the
general ceiling imposed on all items of property. The general ceiling
is found in section 3(13) which provides that:
156. United States v. Central Stockholders' Corp., 52 F.2d 322, 330 (1931).

Cf.

United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 427 (1940): "We
assume without deciding that by compulsion of the method of acquisition provided
in § 14 of the Power Act . . . these riparian rights may pass to the United States
for less than [fair] value."
157. Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 335 U.S. 359, 375 (1948).
158. The inconsistency of the FPC record in not proceeding on the land
cost front was noted by Commissioner Smith. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,
9 F.P.C. 228, 252, 261 (1950). The commission itself reluctantly admitted that it had

allowed as a project cost, all of the very high prices paid by Niagara for mills
similar to Pettebone Cataract, but which were sold with water rights "attached."
Probably the high land cost was due to water rights. See, Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp., 9 F.P.C. at 252n. (1950). The commission in a recent opinion still
apparently recognizes some unexplained difference between acquiring water rights
and paying a high price for land because it is useful as a power site. In the
10,753,
Matter of Grand River Dam Authority, CCH FED. UTrn. LAw REP. (2d ed.) 1111
10,757 (1953). It might well be improper for a utility to acquire riparian land solely
for the water rights; if it did so, only so much of the cost as is attributable to the value
of water rights should be allowed in the rate base. The remainder, paid for the
fast land qua land, would be excluded as not used in the production of power.
Redding v. North Cal. Power Co. P.U.R. 1916F, 801.828 (Cal. Ry. Comm'n. 1916).
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net investment in a project means the actual legitimate
original cost thereof..

,,159

This has been construed to signify the cost of the property to the person
who first devoted it to public service, or "original cost." 160 Accordingly, the limitation of Section 14 will apply only if the "actual reasonable" cost to a licensee had been less than its "original cost." 161
Allowance of Actual Cost:-Foran expenditure to be allowed as
an "actual cost," a licensee must have paid out the claimed amount in
money or its equivalent in property. Further, it must be paid out in
an arms' length transaction to a non-affiliated company. The FPC
stated this some time ago when it defined actual cost as that which is:
" . . .real and bona fide, as distinguished from fictitious or fabricated, whether by intercorporate dealings or otherwise." ' 2
There seems no doubt that a licensee can be limited to the "actual
cost" of water rights, as defined above, especially in view of the numerous decisions upholding FPC determinations which disallowed claimed
project costs, because it was found that they were paid as profits to
affiliates or were mere book write-ups. Similarly, the FPC has been
upheld in cases where it disallowed amounts actually paid to the extent
that they exceeded "original cost." 13
Allowance of Reasonable Cost:-As to the second ceiling,
expenditures for water rights, to be allowed, must be "reasonable."
This term is neither defined nor mentioned elsewhere in the Act. There
is no definition of it in either FPC regulations or in administrative or
159. As previously noted, certain deductions are made from the project cost
to determine net investment. See text at note 38 spra. It is also true that § 14,
16 U.S.C. § 807 (1946), itself imposed another general ceiling, for it provides
that the price to be paid on recapture shall not exceed the "fair value" of the
project, which of course may be less than the net investment.
160. See, e.g., Niagara Falls Power Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 787, 794-5 (2d Cir.
1942) ; Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 129 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1942).
161. Strangely, the FPC regulations require the cost of water rights to be
recorded at "first cost," a term nowhere defined. 18 CoDE FED. REGS. § 101.3-9(b)
(1949).
162. Louisville Hydro Electric Co., 13 FPC AN. REP. 307, 314 (1933).
The
commission was there defining "actual legitimate original cost," term by term.
The use of the word "actual" in § 14, 16 U.S.C. § 807 (1946), may be redundant
if it has the same significance in § 3(13), 16 U.S.C. § 796 (1946).
It is not clear,
however, whether the construction § 3(13) signifying "original" cost is really
only a construction of the words "original cost" or of the entire limitation ("actual
legitimate original cost"). Only if it is the latter does the use of "actual" in
§ 14 have independent significance. A further indication of the redundancy of
"actual" in § 14 is shown by the fact that the FPC regulations now define cost
itself to include only amounts "actually paid" for property. 18 CoDE FED. REGs.

§ 101.02-1

(1949).

163. See note 35 supra.
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judicial decisions."
The legislative history offers no assistance. To
achieve a sensible and fair solution we must not only analyze the
Power Act with its "hiatuses and inconsistencies," 164a but also the
relevant case law.
On its face, the term "reasonable" means that the FPC must exercise its judgment as to what would be the prudent amount for a
licensee to pay for water rights; if he paid more than this amount, it
should be disallowed, even though the transaction was valid under state
law, and he was the first person to devote the water rights to public
service. It is submitted that the following types of expenditures, discussed more fully below, should be so disallowed, as unreasonable:
1) Amounts paid by a licensee which are attributable to speculative values; for instance when the seller had insufficient property
or financial backing for himself to use the water rights for power
generation, but obtained an extraordinarily high price for reasons
such as the urgent needs of the licensee.
2) Amounts paid by the licensee which are attributable to the value
that the water rights would have after the licensed period has expired. Issuance of a federal license made it unnecessary and
therefore unreasonable for a licensee to acquire or pay for water
rights attributable to this "remainder."
The Constitutionality of these Interpretations of "Reasonable
Cost":-The interpretations set out above appear to be constitutional
and also a proper construction of the Power Act. For the discussion
of the constitutional question, the latter will be assumed. Next, the
question of construction will be resolved.
Licensees will object that these interpretations may lead to disallowance of amounts paid by them in arm's length transactions, valid
under state law. This would take their property without just compensation, whenever "net investment" is used in recapture or rate making.
164. In the Louiszille case, srupra note 162, the commission defined "legitimate"
cost, which is part of the general ceiling, as meaning "not coercive, collusive, fraudulent or unreasonable."
These meanings make up part of the interpretation of
"reasonable cost" here advanced. To that extent the use of "reasonable" in § 14,
16 U.S.C. § 807 (1946), is perhaps redundant, i.e., if the FPC insistence on
"original cost" is based only upon the last two words in §3(13), 16 U.S.C. §716
(1946), limiting project costs to the "actual legitimate original cost" of property
acquired for the project. In Alabama Power v. McNinch, the District of Columbia
Circuit indicated that "legitimate" in § 3 (13) and "reasonable" in § 14 are synonymous.
Alabama Power v. McNinch, 94 F.2d 601, 606, n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
See also,
Susquehanna Power Co., 4 F.P.C. 74, 121-24 (1944) ; Sa. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong.
1st Sess. 18 (1935); H.R. REP. 1903, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 73 (1935).
However,
the position of this article is not substantially changed even if § 14 is a redundant
statement of § 3 (13). The only change would be that the interpretation of "reasonable cost" advanced here in regard to water rights would also apply to "legitimate
cost" as applied to them. See notes 37 and 162 mipra.
164a. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. FPC, supra note 37 at 723. The relation of
Section 14 to Sections 3(13) and 10(d) is discussed in notes 37, 162, 164 supra.
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The cases upholding "original cost" as the measure of project costs, will
There, licensees were uniformly ordered to
meet this objection."
write out of their project accounts the price that they paid in arms'
length transactions to the extent that this price exceeded the "original
cost" of the project. This action is much more drastic than the disallowances which result from the definition here proposed. Further, the
latter cost would have to be determined by a method which would
sharply contrast to the automatic and drastic disallowances made by
the original cost cases. That is, an answer could not be reached merely
by reference to any set of account books.
True, the proposed method of valuation may be complex and require evaluation of differing expert opinion on the facts of each case.
Yet the same approach is used wherever a problem of reasonable
value occurs-whether it is in eminent domain, rate, or tax proceedings. Furthermore, simplicity and uniformity of method, desirable
as they may be, are less vital than the end of substantial justice which
here requires, not an executive or accountant's edict, but case by case
adjudication.
The constitutional objection is also met by the fact that the limitation on allowance for water rights is a valid condition of the federal
license, to which the licensee has agreed. Imposition of such conditions has been upheld in the past, both in reference to state law and to
the very provisions of the Power Act in question. In Fox River Paper
Co. v. RailroadCommission 166 as a condition in the licensing of a dam,
the State of Wisconsin provided for recapture by the state upon payment of reproduction costs of the plant at the time of recapture. However, in respect to water rights, the state would pay only their fair
value at the time of licensing. The applicant contended that freezing
the amount allowed for water rights would deprive it of the true value
that the rights might have at the time of recapture, and therefore, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed, and
held, in an opinion by Justice Stone, that imposition of this condition
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment for it was a proper exercise
of the state's sovereign power over waters within the state. Compliance with the condition was " . . . the price which plaintiffs must pay

to secure the right to maintain their dam." 16T On these very grounds
section 14 of the Power Act, the section here under consideration, was
held constitutional in New River. Justice Reed held:
we assume without deciding that by compulsion of the
method of acquisition provided in § 14 of the Power Act and the
165. See note 35 supra.
166. 274 U.S. 651 (1927).
167. Id. at 657.
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tendered license, these riparian rights may pass to the United States
for less than their value [at the time of recapture]. In our view this
'is the price which [respondents] must pay to secure the right to
maintain their dam.' The quoted words are the conclusion of
Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission. Tie case is
decisive on the issue of confiscation .

.

. The fact that the Fox

River case involved a state and this case involves the United
States is immaterial from the due process standpoint." 168
Licensees may argue, however, that both Fox River and New
River held that a licensee might be denied the fair value of water rights
at the time of recapture, but do not support the above position where
it is proposed to deny part of the licensee's out of pocket costs. 69
Again the answer to this is to be found in the "original cost" cases.
The Proposed Interpretation of "Reasonable Cost" as a Proper
Construction of the Power Act:--Constitutional objections having
been met, we pass to the question of whether the suggested interpretations of "reasonable cost" are in accord with the remainder of the
Power Act. Before we do so, it is pertinent to observe that it has
been well settled that the United States in furtherance of its navigation
power can take over water rights, or prohibit their use, without giving compensation. 70 Therefore, no payment should be required unless
there is specific statutory direction requiring the United States to pay
for any state created rights it disturbs."' As explained, the Power
168. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 427-8 (1940).
169. Yet no one would deny that it would be proper to pay only the fair value
of a project at the time of recapture, even though this value be less than the cost
of the project to the licensee. Section 14, 16 U.S.C. § 807 (1946), provides that
fair value be used in such a situation. And in regard to licensees whose use of
water was a right vested as against the United States, the fair value as of the
date of licensing must be allowed in the recapture price. § 23, 16 U.S.C. §816
(1946). This may be constitutionally required. Cf. Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
170. See text at note 68 supra.
171. The Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 STAT. 388 (1902), as amended, 43 U.S.C.
§§371 et seq. (1928), illustrates the proposition that when the government is to
pay for water rights, Congress can say so. See, United States v. Gerlach Livestock
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 734 (1950). Cf. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
See also, Boulder Canyon Project Act, §§ 8, 13, 45 Stat. 1057, 1062, 1064 (1928);
43 U.S.C. M§617(g), 617(1)(1946); Arizona v. California, supra note 71.
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act was the model for § 27 of the Power Act, 16
U.S.C. § 822 (1946); but, in addition to the words used in § 27, it contains the
following language: "The Secretary of the Interior in carrying out the provisions
of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such [state] laws, and nothing
herein shall in anyway affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government
or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate
stream or the waters thereof. . . ." Justice Jackson stated in United States v.
Gerlach Livestock, supra, that the quoted words of §8, 16 U.S.C. §801 (1946),
"parallels that [sic] in" the Ford case. But the Ford dictum did not consider
the full ramifications of the recapture provisions of the Power Act, nor was the
Government a party in that case. A more parallel case is United States v. Central
Stockholders' Corp., 52 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1931), not cited by the Justice.
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Act substitutes for such payment a system of reimbursement of the
licensee of its "reasonable" expenditures for water rights for which it
has not been previously reimbursed by consumers. This result should
be anticipated by anyone who has acquired water rights since enactment of the Power Act. As to those who purchased water rights prior
to the Act, at least the federal servitude and its drastic possibilities
were known.' 72 In regard to these early acquisitions one might hope
for administrative and judicial sensitivity in applying the principles of
valuations suggested here; at least if there was, what Commissioner
Smith saw in the Niagara situation, "

.

. . a bona fide payment at

arms length in accordance with the custom and general understanding
of the law at that time." 17
(1) Disallowance of amounts paid for speculative values:Amounts paid for speculative values should be disallowed under the
Power Act. An analogy can be drawn to condemnation proceedings,
where a condemnee is denied values claimed for special use of land
if the court finds his claim too fanciful or impossible of achievement." 4
It seems proper to disallow amounts paid by a licensee for such values
as well as for "hold-up" values in a negotiated purchase; the only decision in point has upheld FPC action which did just this. 7 5 If an excessive price was demanded by the seller, the licensee should have proceeded to condemn the land or water rights necessary for his project,
and thus protected himself from such extortion.' 78 In eminent domain
proceedings the condemnee has to demonstrate the special value possessed by his water rights, that is, the kind of use he could have made
of them. Unless he had enough property to develop a power site he
7
will not be compensated for value as a power site.1
172. E.g., Niagara Falls Power Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1942);
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 123 F.2d 155 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 806 (1942).
173. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 9 F.P.C. 261 (1950).
The FPC has
recently acted with such sensitivity in Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro,
335 U.S. 359, 374 (1948). See text at note 186 infra.
174. Similarly, § 14, 16 U.S.C. § 807 (1946), also prohibits any amount being
allowed in net investment for "going value, or prospective revenues" of the project.
175. Alabama Power Co. v. FPC, 136 F.2d 929, 931 (5th Cir. 1943). Cf.
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. 63 P.U.R. (N.S.) 501 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1946).
176. Cf. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 79-81 (1913).
In Ford and Son v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U.S. 369, 379 (1930), the Court
commented that it did not pass upon whether or not §21, 16 U.S.C. §814 (1946),
of the Power Act, which gives licensees the power of eminent domain, included
the power to condemn water rights such as those involved in that case. Subsequent
decisions have assumed that such rights may be condemned, e.g., Grand River Dam
Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 335 U.S. 359, 374 (1948). See also, 2 NiCHoLs, EMINENT
DomAix §§ 5.79 et seq. (3d ed. 1950).
177. Compare Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, note 176 supra
(compensation allowed) with United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943)
and Continental Land Co. v. United States, 88 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1937) (compensa-
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In the case of the International Paper rights, compensation should
be given for use of the water in an existing factory or mill, since it
is shown that the water has value for this special use. In the case of
the Pettebone rights, compensation should be allowed for any extra
value that water power may have by reason of having been brought
78

inlandY.

(2) Disallowance of Amounts Paid for "Remainder":-The second qualification of "reasonable cost" would disallow expenditures attributable to use of water rights beyond the licensed period. This is
derived as follows: as far as the Federal Government is concerned, at
the time of recapture it need not acquire any state created water rights
from the licensee or anyone else. The Power Act does not change this,
except that it provides limited reimbursement for amounts that the
licensee had to pay out during the period of his license to acquire state
water rights necessary for the project 7 That is, section 27 of the Act
is to be construed as saving state created water rights, vis a vis licensees and other private persons, but these rights were always subject to
this federal servitude. Nothing new was added to them by the Power
Act.
The application of this interpretation to a licensee who has purchased the fee to water rights, is clear. The value of the use of the
tion not allowed). It should be noted that these comments do not deal with
condemnation by the United States under its navigation power; under that power
no value may be allowed for power site use since the Government has appropriated
the use by the condemnation and need not compensate except for the land as
ordinary land. E.g., United States v. Washington Water Power Co., 41 F. Supp.
119 (D.C. Wash. 1941), aff'd, 135 F.2d 541 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
747 (1943).
The Federal Power Act, however, appears to have required the
licensee to pay compensation for feasible power site use and the United States
is to reimburse therefor.
178. It might be questioned whether these uses of water power would be
efficient enough to be of any value in light of the cheap electricity available to
International and Pettebone. There is another interesting question concerning both
the International and Pettebone rights: whether or not any allowance made for
them should be based on the cost to their respective grantors, both of whom were
predecessors of the present licensee (the original Niagara Falls Power Co. and
the Hydraulic Canal Co.). Both predecessors might be held to have devoted these
water rights to the public service. Their cost therefore would be the "original
cost," the general ceiling upon all allowances. The FPC decision (and consequently
the court of appeals) did not consider the possibility of such a result-disregarding
the intervening withdrawal from public to private use. To do so would seem harshly
retroactive unless the intervening transactions were a sham to raise values. This
does not appear to be the case with the International and Pettebone companies,
both of whom installed machinery in their plants for some years prior to returning
use of the water rights to Niagara.
179. Cf. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 170 (1953). Reimbursement, of course, depends upon the licensee not having been reimbursed by consumers for the water rights, by having included in the rates a charge for their exhaustion. Wherever the consumers have paid for project property, their contribution
will be deducted from the otherwise allowable cost of the project. See text at note
40 supra. See also discussion of Buchanan case note 127 supra.
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water rights over the license period should be subtracted from the cost
of the fee. This value is the "present value" computed as of the date
that the fee was purchased. 8 ° The difference will be the amount to be
disallowed and should be set up as a reserve against the cost of the
8
fee.1 1
In the case of licensees such as Niagara, who have rented, not
purchased, water rights, the solution is more complex. The United
States should reimburse a licensee for rentals to the extent that they
are allowed as an operating expense; for in that way the rentals cannot be held part of (excessive) earnings which reduce the net investment or recapture price. But how can a rental be anything but an operating expense, especially when paid to a third party in an arm's length
transaction? The licensee will have purchased no right to use the water
beyond the licensed period. Usually such a rental will be allowed, in
toto, as an operating expense. Yet a landlord, realizing that his right
to water will cease without compensation, upon recapture, may
"load" rentals with an increment designed to compensate for the value
of the remainder that he would realize upon, but for the federal recapture. If that is the case, so much of the rentals that represent such
increment, must be disallowed. 8 2 The licensee should not have paid
this amount, he could and should have protected himself by condemnation of the rights for the license period.
180. This is provided by the Act, for §14, 16 U.S.C. §807 (1946), says
that the "actual reasonable cost" is to be as of the "time of acquisition by the
licensee." This presents no problem in the case of water rights purchased after
enactment of the Act. See, United States v. Washington Water Power Co., note 177
supra. What of rights purchased before that date? Since the entire purchase price
could be rendered worthless in the discretion of the federal government, it does
not seem unjust to restrict reimbursement for the fee to the value of fifty years
use as of the date of the license. Admittedly this is a rough and ready rule, but
it is also a fair and consistent application of the Act. The alternative, of course,
is to hold that since it could not be anticipated that the water rights had only a
limited life, the full purchase price of the fee will be allowed to the extent that
it does not include speculative values.
181. Perhaps, the reserve should be written off immediately or over a limited
period, to a surplus account. So much of the property account as is allowed in
net investment should not, however, be treated as a wasting asset since the licensee
will receive the full book value at the end of the licensed period. Therefore even
though these water rights are diminishing in value each year, this diminution
cannot be charged to earnings for it will all come back in one lump sum payment
at the end of the license. That substantial sums may be paid for the "remainder"
is illustrated by the instant case, see note 196 infra. For instance, if the nonspeculative value of the fee to water rights is $1,000,000, at the normal rate of
return for utility property, 6%, $60,000 a year will be a fair rental. The present
(or lump sum) value of $60,000 a year, payable semi-annually, for the licensed
period is about $950,000. Thus, under the interpretation here advanced, only
$950,000, not $1,000,000 should be paid and allowed for water rights. This 5%o
(The
differential is not inconsequential in the field of utility regulation.
computation of present value, made in this note and succeeding ones, were made
with the aid of the annuity tables found in PATON, AccouNTANT's HANDBOOK, 1144-5
(3d ed. 1945)).
182. In regard to leases, such as the International one, executed before the
Act went into effect, we have no "loading" problem. See note 15 supra. Since
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The amortization reserve, required by section 10 (d) of the Act I'l
and the cause of the present litigation, is designed to inform the
licensee's security-holders that earnings made before as well as after
twenty years of operation are being understated in the amount by
which water rentals are excessive. The reserve notifies them that upon
recapture this excess expenditure for water rights will be added to
earnings of the project and will be deducted from the project cost to determine the recapture price.'8 4 Of course, under sound accounting
practice, such a reserve should be maintained from the start of the
licensed period; but the Power Act does not give the FPC power to
insist upon it until after 20 years of operation when the amortization
reserve is to be created.
EFFECT OF "ACTUAL,

REASONABLE

COST"

LIMITATION

Condemnation Proceedings:-Atthis point the licensees may suggest that even if the above conclusions are correct, the condemnation
court may not follow them but will instead decree payment both for
speculative values and for use of the water rights beyond the licensed
period; disallowance of such compulsory expenditures would be unfair.
Grand River indicated that such a result might occur if the condemnation proceeding were brought in a state court under the state law of
eminent domain. That is, the Supreme Court would not disturb its
judgment decreeing compensation for such values, yet the FPC would
not be forced to respect the award in a rate or recapture proceeding."8 5
the Act had not been passed at the time of the lease the landlord would not have
suspected that his water rights would become worthless at the expiration of the
license. Accordingly he would not "load" his rental with an increment to compensate for the destruction. Nevertheless, at the time the International lease
was executed it was pretty well known what form the Power Act would take;
hence it should be determined if there was such loading. See text at note 196 infra.
183. This section is set out in note 41 supra.
184. This assumes that earnings over the license period will be excessive.
Because this is a contingency, the Act specifies that only a proportion of earnings
in excess of a specified per cent (usually 6%) be placed in the reserve. In Niagara's
case it is one-half. This prevents tying up too much money that may eventually
not be found to be excessive earnings, and, at the same time, warns the security
holders about the situation. Actually, the reserve is not needed as security by
the United States, for the latter merely subtracts excessive earnings from the
cost of the plant to determine net investment or the recapture price. It is hard
to imagine how earnings could be so excessive as to exceed the cost of the plant.
Yet, since depreciation charges may be included in "earnings," see note 40 supra, the
price upon recapture might be substantially less than the original cost of the project.
Cf. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. FPC, 179 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 957 (1950).
185. "As to the question whether the Federal Power Act should be interpreted
as actually superseding the state law of condemnation and as restricting the measure
of valuation which lawfully may be used by the courts of Oklahoma in a condemnation
action for the acquisition of land for power site purposes by an agency of that
State [who was also a licensee under the Power Act], there is nothing in the
Federal Power Act to indicate that [such] an attempt has been made by Congress
to make such a nationwide change in State law." Grand River Dam Authority v.
Grand-Hydro, 335 U.S. 359, 374 (1948).
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However, in a recent opinion fixing the allowable cost of the Grand
River lands, the FPC has wisely allowed the full price paid by the
licensee whom it refused to penalize for the unforeseen outcome of condemnation proceedings in the state court.... But the tenor of its
opinion indicated that similar results in the future will not be dealt with
as sympathetically.
In Grand River the Court did not pass on what should be the
measure of value in event a licensee seeks to condemn in the federal
court.'8 7 If this forum is used, the Supreme Court will be free to pass
on the method of valuation of the condemned property. A licensee
who condemns the fee to water rights should have to pay only the value
of the use of the rights for the licensed period. Issuance of the license,
in effect decrees that the condemnee's right to compensation for use
of the water will cease at the expiration of the license, since the federal
servitude will then be exercised.
If the United States Does Not Recapture:-The above interpretation of "actual reasonable cost" of water rights also seems to apply if
the United States instead of recapturing, issues a new license to the
original licensee or to a third party, pursuant to section 15 of the Act.'
But even if this conclusion be incorrect, conservative accounting requires that the licensee prepare for the worst-federal recapture. This
means that if the fee has been purchased, a reserve must be set up
against its cost, and that reserves also be created in the rental situation.
In the event that a third party takes over the project, the Act
states that he has the same rights and liabilities as the United States;
section 15 requires him to pay "

.

.

. such amount and assume such

contracts as the United States is required to do in the manner specified
in Section 14." Therefore, for purposes of taking over the project, the
new licensee appears to be a federal instrumentality exercising the federal servitude over navigable waters; but at the same time he must
make the identical reimbursement for past expenditures for water rights
as would the Federal Government. That is, they both pay the original
186. In the Matter of Grand River Dam Authority, CCH FED. UTm.LAW REP.
(2d ed.) 10,753 (1953). Again it is pertinent to observe that the FPC here allowed
as a "reasonable" cost of land, a value which can be traced only to water rights.
Yet, in this very opinion, it distinguished its Niagara Mohawk decision as referring
only to severed water rights which a licensee need not acquire, whereas the licensee
must obtain fast land upon which to locate its project. This seems to be an artificial
distinction in view of the way § 14, 16 U.S.C. § 807 (1946) applies the same standard,
"actual reasonable" cost, to allowance of amounts paid for both lands and water
rights. True, a licensee must acquire fast land, but if the FPC is correct in its
NiagaraMohawk decision, a licensee must not be allowed any sum it paid out which
is attributable to water rights, severed or not. See note 158 supra.
187. Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 335 U.S. 359, 370-2 (1948).
188. Of course this question has not yet arisen since no license issued under the
Act will expire until 1971.
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licensee his net investment, the size of which is diminished by any excessive expenditures made for water rights either in purchasing the fee,
or renting the rights. Insofar as any landlord is concerned, his water
rights are lost by this exercise of the federal servitude.
The same conclusions appear to be true if the original licensee
were to continue to operate the project. The Act provides that at the
end of the licensed period, until a new license is issued, " . . .the Commission shall issue from year to year an annual license to the then
licensee under the terms and conditions of the original license until
the property is taken over or a new license is issued." 9 If a new
license is issued to the original licensee, it is to be, " . . . upon such
terms as may be authorized or required under the then existing laws
and regulations. . . ." ' The Act does not further clarify the quoted
provisions, nor does the legislative history. Apparently their significance was to be left to the courts." 1 The most sensible interpretation
would be that the original licensee should be subject to the same terms
as a third party who receives the license and takes over the project.
This means that his "net investment" will contain only the "actual reasonable cost" of water rights. In the case of (original) licensees who
have purchased a fee to the water rights this will be "actual reasonable
cost" of the fee. In respect to those such as Niagara, who have paid
rentals this means: (1) their net investment will be reduced by excessive rentals they have paid; and (2) they should cease to pay rentals
when the license expires.
Perhaps the above construction of section 15 is incorrect, and private rights in water power continue if there is no recapture. Then
the original licensee who has purchased the fee may upon expiration
of the license add to its property account an amount equal to the value
for the water rights it will use during the period of the new license.
If it has been renting the rights it will continue to pay rentals and be
allowed the "reasonable" value thereof as an operating expense. In
the case of a third party taking over the project, the result would be
about the same. If the original licensee had acquired the fee to the
water rights, the third party could acquire it upon payment of its
"original cost" less any speculative values. Or it could acquire just
the use of the rights for the licensed period. If the original licensee
had been renting the water rights, the new licensee could continue this
practice by paying a "reasonable" rental. But even in this situation,
189. Section 15, 16 U.S.C. § 808 (1946).

190. Ibid.
191. Congress' principal concern was to insure that the original licensee would
continue to remain subject to the Power Act. See, KERWIN, op. cit. supra note 26,

at 260.
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any "unreasonable" expenditures for water rights by the original licensee will not be included in the "net investment," which is also the
purchase price for the new licensee. Although under this assumption
the new licensee must continue to respect state water rights, it need
not pay for its predecessor's mistakes-the original licensee should
have protected itself from making these expenditures by condemnation.
However, as mentioned at the outset of this section, regardless
of the decision as to status of water rights; if the United States does not
recapture, conservative accounting requires that a licensee keep its
accounts on the basis of possible federal recapture, for it represents
the least possible value it may receive from its expenditures for
water rights.
WHAT SHOULD BE

DONE IF

THE

Niagara CASE Is

REMANDED

Below is a summary of how the construction of the Power Act
developed above might be applied to the Niagara case.
International'sRights:--The FPC should determine what would
have been a reasonable annual rental in 1919 when the original lease
of these rights was executed.'
This sum should be compared to the
$99,000 annual rental paid by Niagara as electricity rebates until 1937,
and in cash since that time. If the reasonable rental measured as of
1920 was less than what it did pay, Niagara should add the difference
to its earned surplus, since its past earnings have been understated by
this amount. But since this amount has already been paid to International as a current expense of a past period, it is not available for dividends and the like. Therefore, a special contra account or reserve
should be set up against it to indicate this situation. It would not
seem to be proper to set up such a contra account on the asset side of
the balance sheet since this money had been paid out for a past period,
and has no prospective usefulness, as would expenses in floating security
issues or organization expenses.19
For the years since 1941, special provisions apply. That is, the.
FPC has directed that one-half of Niagara's earnings in excess of 6%
made since 1941 be placed in the Amortization Reserve required by the
Act. This means that one-half of the excessive rentals paid since 1941
must be added to this reserve which is credited against the cost of
the project in determining net investment; provided, of course, earn192. The 1937 agreement, discussed in note 20 supra betveen Niagara and
International changing the rental from a rebate on electricity to a flat sum, did not
extinguish the basic obligation entered into in 1919.
193. See, Baker, Debt, Discount and Expense, 64 HARV. L. REv. 417 (1951).
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ings for the entire licensed period are found excessive. It is true that
these requirements of the amortization reserve are less stringent than
those suggested here, but conservative accounting which truly reflects
the security holder's interest in the enterprise would seem to require
the accounting set forth above.' 9 4
Pettebone Rights:-The rentals paid for the Pettebone rights
should be treated in the same manner as the International rentals. That
is, the difference between the reasonable rental as of the date of the
lease-1925-and the $37,800 a year in rebated electric charges,"'
should be placed in a reserve against earned surplus. In 1947, Niagara
purchased the fee to the Pettebone rights for $728,415.48. The FPC
should determine if this sum exceeded the reasonable value of the water
rights at that time.' 9 6 This determination should be made in accord
with the principles outlined above, keeping in mind that compensation
for use of the Pettebone rights need not be paid after 1971 when
Niagara's license will expire. To the extent that the price paid by
Niagara was unreasonable, it should be placed in a reserve account to
offset the property account which reflects ownership of the water
rights.' 9 7 On the right hand side of the balance sheet, earned surplus
should be reduced by this amount. This will show how much of the
purchase price is allowable as part of Niagara's net investment.
Courses of Action Open to Niagara:-Finallywe should consider
what alternatives the above solution leaves to Niagara other than
194. It might be contended that §§ 301, 304 of the Power Act, (16 U.S.C. §§ 825,
825(c) (1946)), would prevent Niagara from maintaining the conservative reserve
here suggested. This section gives the FPC power to prescribe uniform accounts for
licensees. See Kripke, supra note 34, at 433; Shapiro, The Effect of Federal Power
Commission Accounting Orders otn Dividend Legality, 59 YALE L.J. 597 (1950).
However, it is difficult to see why the FPC should complain of undue conservatism
on the part of Niagara, as long as the rate payers are not being charged therefor.
195. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, supra note 1, at 197.
196. Since the seller of the water rights, Buffalo Niagara, and the buyer,
Niagara, were affiliated (see notes 23 and 24 supra) perhaps the allowance in net
investment should be limited to the reasonable value of the water rights in 1925
when the seller acquired them, if that figure is lower than their reasonable value
upon Niagara's acquisition in 1943. If the $37,800 rental is capitalized at 6%, payable semi-annually, the value of the water rights in 1925 for the then remaining 46
.years of the license was about $590,000 or about $135,000 less than Buffalo Niagara
paid for them. The latter's purchase price of $725,000 represents a present value
as of 1925 determined by capitalizing the $37,800 rental at 431% payable semiannually.
197. In 1947 Niagara's license had 28 years to run. At 6%, payable semiannually, the then present value of Niagara's $37,800 annual rental of the water
rights, amounted to about $478,000, or about $250,000 less than the purchase price
of the fee for the rights. The difference is attributable either to the unnecessary
"remainder," or to an increase in the price level between 1925 and 1947. If the
latter, quaere: was it "reasonable," in the § 14 sense, for Niagara to have acquired
the fee? It should be noted in this connection that the purchase price paid by
Niagara represents a present value in 1943, of the annual rental to be paid until 1971,
determined at somewhat less than 21/2% payable semi-anually. This is an unusually
low rate of return for utility property.
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charging its stockholders, i.e., a surplus account, for these excessive
expenditures for water rights. In regard to the purchase of the fee
to the Pettebone rights, there is probably no other course.
In regard to the International rights, several courses of action
present themselves: Niagara might stop paying rentals to International, but continue to use the water. International could seek an
injunction to stop Niagara's use of the water or seek contract damages. Either suit should be successful for we have seen that even
though International's right to the water terminates in 1971, until
then under New York law and the Power Act, Niagara must give
compensation if it uses the water. In assessing damages, the court
should award only the "reasonable" value of the water rights determined as indicated above.'
In effect this would be a condemnation
proceeding for the years covered by the suit. This suggests the second
alternative, that Niagara condemn or purchase the fee to water rights,
paying the non-speculative value of their use until 1971.'
However, the above alternatives might subject Niagara to a far
greater loss than would result from continuing to pay under the
existing lease, because today's price level is much higher than that
of 1919 when the lease was executed. On the other hand, a condemnation court might consider certain factors which limit the value
of International's water rights. They become valueless in 1971. In
the intervening period the use of the water rights by anyone other
than Niagara is impractical because of the two factors: the difficulty
of obtaining the necessary license, 200 and the expense involved in reestablishing the International plant.
198. The conclusions stated here, of course, depend upon the conclusion that the
taking over of the project by a new licensee or continued operation by Niagara,
would not be different from the United States recapturing. See text at note 188
et seq. supra.
199. If the price levels were the same, the present value, at 6% payable semiannually, of a rental of $99,000 a year for the remaining eighteen years of Niagara's
license (1953-1971) would amount to about $1,080,000. This compares to a present
value at the same rate, for the fifty year use in 1921, of about $1,565,000.
200. Niagara is licensed to divert all but 275 c.f.s. of the water that may be
diverted from the United States side of the River under the Treaty of 1909. 36
STAT. 2448 (1909).
Even if Niagara's license did not cover the water that International would seek to use, the FPC might deny International a license on the ground
that its use of water would be inefficient. See notes 18, 178 supra. This is similar
to the situation in the Radio Station WOW case, note 142 supra, where the party with'
the FCC license was held to lack title under state law to the transmitting facilities;
the owner lacked an FCC license. Apparently, the impasse was resolved by a
settlement between the parties which was approved by the FCC. Radio Station
WOW, Inc., 11 F.C.C. 1450 (1946). A similar outcome could be hoped for in the
instant case. But in any case the lack of a license does not deprive the International
water rights of all value. It will be recalled that the plaintiff in the Ford case, note
103 supra, recovered its judgment although it lacked an FPC license.

